



*Financement public des
campagnes électorales
et partis politiques,
2006-2012*

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No 134

**Financement public des campagnes électorales et partis politiques,
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Bibliographie sélective

par

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Septembre 2012

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ALLEMAGNE

1. Atwill, Nicole. **Campaign finance: Germany**. [Site Web consulté le 5 juillet 2012].

<http://www.loc.gov/law/help/campaign-finance/germany.php>

« German election laws and campaign finance laws differ significantly from those of the United States. In Germany, the political parties are tightly run organizations that finance election campaigns, nominate candidates, exact membership dues from their members, and subject members in Parliament to strict caucus rules. The parties receive government funds and are subject to some not very onerous disclosure requirements. The individual candidates or members of Parliament are minor players in these systems. [...] Aside from a prohibition on influencing the voters on Election Day in or near the polling place, Germany has no federal legislation on political advertisements. Political speech may be robust, but it is not exempt from the governance of the criminal laws, and these contain stringent provisions against various forms of hate speech, insult, and defamation. There are no limits on campaign spending ».

2. Detterbeck, Klaus. **Party cartel and cartel parties in Germany**. *German Politics*. Vol. 17, no 1, p. 27-40.

<http://search.ebscohost.com/login.aspx?direct=true&db=aph&AN=30049705&lang=fr&site=ehost-live>

« Germany seems to be an ideal case for the cartel theory. Public funding for political parties is strongly advanced and there is much inter-party cooperation with respect to the organisational self-interests of parties. This contribution will take a closer look at the formation of the German party cartel and the three analytical dimensions of the cartel model. I will argue that in terms of party organisations, societal linkages and competitive styles German parties only partly match the expectations of the cartel model. Or, to put it more bluntly, there is a party cartel in Germany, but there are no cartel parties ».

3. German Bundestag. **Le financement public des partis politiques**. Berlin: [s.n.], 2008. 12 p.

http://www.bundestag.de/htdocs_f/bundestag/fonctions/partis/financement.pdf

4. Koss, Michael. **Party goals, institutional veto points and the discourse on political corruption: the evolution of the german party funding regime**. *Journal of Elections, Public Opinion & Parties*. Vol. 18, no 3 (august 2008), p. 283-301.

<http://search.ebscohost.com/login.aspx?direct=true&db=poh&AN=33299320&lang=fr&site=ehost-live>

« This article aims to integrate existing theories on parties and political systems with the literature on party funding. On an empirical level, it asks why the German system of party funding developed in the way that it did. Germany combines a system of high transparency levels for political parties with generous state funding. Taking actor-centred institutionalism as a starting point, three variables are identified which explain the evolution of party funding regimes: the number of veto points available to opposition parties, parties' dominant goals during decisions on reforms of funding regulation, and the public discourse on political corruption. Reforms of party funding regimes are assumed to

become more probable (1) the more institutional veto points even opposition parties have at their disposal, (2) the lesser the influence of vote-seeking strategies among parties, and (3) the more intense the societal discourse on political corruption. These hypotheses find support from the German case and may therefore be able to explain the convergence of western European party funding regimes around state subventions and transparency obligations ».

AUSTRALIE ET NOUVELLE-ZÉLANDE

5. Geddis, Andrew. **Rethinking the funding of New Zealand's election campaigns.** *Policy Quarterly*. Vol. 3, no 1 (2007), p. 3-10.
<http://ips.ac.nz/publications/files/2ce6b2f4658.pdf>

« This article is therefore intended to provide a background to whatever planned reforms may emerge by setting out the underlying problem involved with the issue of funding election campaigns. It then outlines the various regulatory choices available to respond to this problem. The difficulties that the 2005 campaign caused for New Zealand's present regulatory scheme are then recounted, along with some suggestions for how these may be combated. Shortcomings with the present method of enforcing the rules on election campaign funding are examined. Finally, the article concludes with some suggestions as to how the process of reforming the rules in this area should be approached ».

6. Holmes, Brenton **Political financing: regimes and reforms in Australian states and territories.** Canberra: Parliament of Australia, 2012. 52 p. (Background note).
http://parlinfo.aph.gov.au/parlInfo/download/library/prspub/1508854/upload_binary/1508854.pdf;fileType=application%2Fpdf#search=%22library/prspub/1508854%22

« This Background Note seeks to describe how Australian states and territories regulate party political financing and fund election campaigns, and to give an account of the various reforms being contemplated or implemented by governments. Generally speaking, regulation both prescribes the mechanisms for the public funding of election campaigns and sets down rules for the monitoring and public disclosure of parties' receipts and expenditures and political donations by individuals and others. In this Background Note, each state or territory political financing regime is addressed on its own terms. Each jurisdiction section begins with an overview of the current arrangements that apply to the public funding of election campaigns. This is followed by an account of the monitoring and disclosure provisions for political expenditure and donations. (These are summarised briefly in Appendix 1). An overview of each jurisdiction's reforms—attempted or effected—completes the account. A separate companion Background Note details the political financing regime and reforms at the Commonwealth level ».

7. Holmes, Brenton **Public political financing.** Dans *Electoral and political financing: the Commonwealth regime and its reforms*. Canberra: Parliament of Australia, 2012, p. 4-18. (Background note).
http://parlinfo.aph.gov.au/parlInfo/download/library/prspub/1508854/upload_binary/1508854.pdf;fileType=application%2Fpdf#search=%22library/prspub/1508854%22

« The financing of political activity from the public purse is a topic of enduring controversy. In Australia, where voting is compulsory, the question of the extent to which public funds should be applied to facilitating election campaigns and political party activity has a special resonance. Under the Commonwealth Electoral Act 1918 as it currently stands, registered political parties are eligible to receive public election funding regardless of electoral expenditure ».

8. Orr, Graeme. **Political finance law in Australia**. Dans *Party funding and campaign financing in international perspective*. S. Issacharoff; K. D. Ewing. Oxford: Hart publishing, 2006, p. 99-122.
JF2112 C28 P37 2006 Université McGill

9. Orr, Graeme. **Public money and electioneering: a view from across the Tasman**. *Policy Quarterly*. Vol. 6, no 3 (august 2010), p. 21-25.
<http://ips.ac.nz/publications/files/bd23965e926.pdf>

« This article compares some key aspects of political finance regulation in Australia and New Zealand. It centres on public money and electioneering expenditure. These are treated in three sections: expenditure limits; incumbency benefits, such as government advertising and parliamentary entitlements; and direct public funding of electioneering ».

AUTRES PAYS

10. Booth, Eric; Robbins, Joseph. **Assessing the impact of campaign finance on party system institutionalization**. *Party Politics*. Vol. 16, no 5 (september 2010), p. 629-650.
<http://search.ebscohost.com/login.aspx?direct=true&db=aph&AN=53400496&lang=fr&site=ehost-live>

« There are numerous advantages to institutionalized party systems; yet the instability in post-communist party systems has been well documented. Thus, it is increasingly important to understand how parties become institutionalized. Scholars have examined various dynamics of campaign finance's effect on politics; however, despite this increased attention, several important theoretical and empirical questions remain. In this article, we investigate campaign finance, institutional, and economic explanations for post-communist party development. We test the impact of campaign finance restrictions and public fund availability on several measures of party institutionalization. The results of our analysis are important for outlining the role of public financing and restrictions on structuring party development ».

11. Carlson, Matthew. **Financing democracy in Japan: the allocation and consequences of government subsidies to political parties**. *Party Politics*. Vol. 18, no 3 (may 2012), p. 391-408.
<http://search.ebscohost.com/login.aspx?direct=true&db=poh&AN=74469006&lang=fr&site=ehost-live>

« In 1994, the Japanese Diet implemented a system of public assistance for political parties which many hoped would encourage party-centred rather than candidate-centred

campaigns. This study examines some of the consequences of this system for party organizations and politicians. Using data culled from official subsidy and campaign finance reports, two empirical questions are addressed: first, how has the advent of the subsidy affected the funds available to national party organizations and to individual politicians? Second, what are the factors that shape the allocation of the subsidy from national party organizations to party branches? It is argued that the subsidy has made it easier for party organizations to access funds but that the amounts of subsidies received by individual politicians are generally too small to alleviate much of their fund-raising pressures. In addition, party leaders have allocated the subsidy largely by following a principle of equality ».

12. Ejima, Akiko. **Revisiting transparency and disclosure in Japanese political reform.** Dans *Party funding and campaign financing in international perspective*. S. Issacharoff; K. D. Ewing. Oxford: Hart publishing, 2006, p. 123-152.
JF2112 C28 P37 2006 Université McGill

13. Gowda, M. V. Rajeev; Sridharan, E. **Reforming India's party financing and election expenditure laws.** *Election Law Journal*. Vol. 11, no 2 (2012), p. 226-240.
<http://search.ebscohost.com/login.aspx?direct=true&db=poh&AN=78116635&lang=fr&site=ehost-live>

« Competitive political parties and election campaigns are central to the health of democracies. Parties and campaigns require significant resources to be effective. India has developed complex election expenditure, political party funding, and reporting and disclosure laws. We suggest that these laws may have perverse impacts on the electoral system: they tend to drive campaign expenditure underground and foster a reliance on unaccounted funds or "black money." This tends to lead to an adverse selection system, in which those willing and able to work with black money dominate politics. We conclude with some possible remedies, including partial state financing of political parties, that might restore the health of India's electoral system ».

14. Kostadinova, Tatiana. **The impact of finance regulations on political parties: the case of Bulgaria.** *Europe-Asia Studies*. Vol. 59, no 5 (2007), p. 807-827.
<http://search.ebscohost.com/login.aspx?direct=true&db=aph&AN=25728623&lang=fr&site=ehost-live>

« This article suggests that a successful explanation of the development of Bulgaria's post-1989 party system must include the rules governing funding of political organisations. By examining the composition of party incomes and spending practices, I evaluate patterns and trends in fund raising using official party self-reported accounts and other data for 2001 - 05. I conclude that the specific public funding regime led to the emergence of three tiers of parties. The case of Bulgaria suggests that in the absence of strict regulations for reporting and enforcement mechanisms, the image of parties as representatives of the public interest was seriously damaged ».

15. Levush, Ruth. **Campaign finance: Israel.** [Site Web consulté le 5 juillet 2012].
<http://www.loc.gov/law/help/campaign-finance/israel.php>

« Political candidates are included in the party groups and candidate lists competing in the general elections for the Knesset (Parliament). Their candidacy is supported by their party, which incurs expenses in promoting them. Candidates, however, also run independent campaigns in their party primaries. Israel's campaign finance laws restrict the identity of donors and the amounts of both donations and expenses. Parties and candidate lists may receive funding from both public and private sources. The restrictions imposed by law are recognized as potentially infringing upon freedom of speech. Constitutional rights in Israel, however, are not considered absolute, and have to be balanced against competing constitutional rights, such as the right of equality ».

16. Mietzner, Marcus. **Party financing in post-Soeharto Indonesia: between State subsidies and political corruption.** *Contemporary Southeast Asia*. Vol. 27, no 2 (2007), p. 238-263.

17. Pacini, Maria Chiara. **Public funding of political parties in Italy.** *Modern Italy*. Vol. 14, no 2 (may 2009), p. 183-202.
<http://search.ebscohost.com/login.aspx?direct=true&db=poh&AN=39656593&lang=fr&sitete=ehost-live>

« Public funding of political parties in Italy has developed along quite clear-cut lines: increasingly generous reimbursements; non-selective criteria for the allocation of funds; and an increase in the number of beneficiaries. The current reimbursement system costs the State more than 250 million euros a year. The payment of such reimbursements in annual instalments means that in many cases they continue to receive funds even though they are no longer politically active. However, the most problematic issue concerns party fragmentation. Reimbursements are paid out at different levels of electoral competition (European, general and regional), effectively providing parties with different channels of funding. This is a big opportunity, above all for small parties that often find it difficult to reach the thresholds for representation and funding in some spheres of the electoral competition. This is even more evident if one considers that public funding is the main source of revenue for the Italian political parties ».

18. Portugal, Adriana Cuoco; Bugarin, Maurício. **Electoral campaign financing: the role of public contributions and party ideology.** *Economia*. Vol. 8, no 1 (fall 2007), p. 143-171.
<http://search.ebscohost.com/login.aspx?direct=true&db=poh&AN=33117142&lang=fr&sitete=ehost-live>

« This article analyzes the electoral campaign financing mechanisms of political parties in Latin America in a general framework. This electoral competition model helps assess how policy decisions are affected by private and public contributions when parties have different ideologies. This model focuses on elections for the legislature. With the use of this model, it is shown that political parties tend to announce divergent platforms that reflect the parties' rigid ideology, which results to policies that are not socially optimal ».

19. Posada-Carbó, Eduardo. **Democracy, parties and political finance in Latin America.** [S.l.]: [s.n.], 2008. 40 p.
<https://kellogg.nd.edu/publications/workingpapers/WPS/346.pdf>

« This paper tries to link the topic of political finance to the wider question of democracy and political parties in Latin America. By doing so, it aims at providing a conceptual framework within which the subject of political finance could acquire some centrality, hitherto missing in both the academic literature and current debates. The first section examines the extent to which, in spite of renewed democratic developments in Latin America during the last two decades, dominant views of democracy in the region continue to neglect and even undermine the significance of political parties and elections in the workings of democracy. This is followed by a discussion of how prevalent concepts of democracy can impinge on the course of political reform. Admittedly any attempt at establishing such a link is fraught with difficulties, and I only venture a few suggestions by looking at the debate among opinion makers and legislators regarding the prospects for political reform in a single country: Colombia. In the last section, I discuss how public funding—a trend visible in most Latin American countries, apparently adopted to fight corruption and to guarantee equality—may be affecting political parties and party systems in the region. A central, underlying assumption of this paper is that ideas are paramount in shaping the course of policy making, thus conditioning any process of political reform »

BELGIQUE

20. Cadranel, Benjamin; Ludmer, Julie. **Le système de financement des partis politiques en Belgique.** *Courrier hebdomadaire du CRISP*. Nos 2001-2002 (2008), p. 7-25.

« Afin de mesurer les conséquences réelles d'une privatisation de la dotation publique des partis jugés liberticides, il est indispensable de rappeler les lignes directrices du financement des partis politiques. La Loi du 4 juillet 1989 relative à la limitation et au contrôle des dépenses électorales y occupe une place centrale. Nous verrons cependant que, outre la donation publique prévue par la loi du 4 juillet 1989, il existe d'autres sources importantes de financement public des partis. Le présent chapitre sera consacré à la présentation de ces différentes sources, du contexte dans lequel elles sont nées et de l'évolution législative et réglementaire qu'elles ont connues ».

21. Faniel, Jean. **Le financement des campagnes électorales.** Dans *Le financement de la vie politique*. J. Faniel. Bruxelles: Centre de recherche et d'information socio-politiques, 2010, p. 51-60. (Dossiers du CRISP: 75).
320.9493'04 C397 75

« Les campagnes électorales constituent un moment particulier de la vie politique. Jusqu'à la fin des années 1980, en Belgique comme dans d'autres pays occidentaux, les sommes dépensées par les partis politiques en frais de campagne électorale ont eu tendance à enfler considérablement. Pour limiter ce phénomène, la Chambre des représentants et le Sénat ont adopté des règles strictes, assorties de procédures de contrôle spécifiques, pour déterminer les dépenses que les listes et leurs candidats peuvent consentir pour assurer au cours d'une campagne électorale. C'est aussi dans ce but, au moins pour partie, que les dons aux partis politiques et à leurs candidats ont été sévèrement encadrés, comme on l'a vu dans la troisième partie. En contrepartie, le législateur a prévu le mode de financement public des partis politiques représentés au Parlement fédéral exposé ci-dessus ».

22. Faniel, Jean. **Le financement des partis politiques**. Dans *Le financement de la vie politique*. J. Faniel. Bruxelles: Centre de recherche et d'information socio-politiques, 2010, p. 39-50. (Dossiers du CRISP: 75).
320.9493'04 C397 75

« Le financement des partis politiques constitue également un aspect important du financement de la vie politique, les partis étant eux-mêmes un rouage fondamental de celle-ci. Ce financement s'alimente à diverses sources. On distinguera ci-après le financement direct public des partis politiques, le financement direct privé de ceux-ci, et leur financement indirect ».

23. Verdussen, Marc. **Le financement public des partis politiques en Belgique**. *Revue générale de droit*. Vol. 36, no 4 (2006), p. 591-608.

« Le 4 juillet 1989, la Belgique s'est dotée d'une loi fédérale mettant en place un dispositif de financement public direct des partis politiques, confirmant ainsi la transformation de leur nature et de leur rôle dans la démocratie contemporaine. Cette loi a été modifiée à plusieurs reprises. En contrepartie de ce financement, elle impose aux partis politiques des obligations précises : le plafonnement des dépenses de propagande électorale; la réglementation de l'utilisation de certains moyens de propagande électorale; l'interdiction des dons de personnes morales et d'associations de fait, ainsi que la limitation et l'identification des dons de personnes physiques; la transparence de la comptabilité des partis ».

24. Weekers, Karolien; Maddens, Bart; Noppe, Jo. **Explaining the evolution of the party finance regime in Belgium**. *Journal of Elections, Public Opinion & Parties*. Vol. 19, no 1 (february 2009), p. 25-48.

<http://search.ebscohost.com/login.aspx?direct=true&db=poh&AN=36188752&lang=fr&site=ehost-live>

« Belgian political parties have been receiving state funding since 1971, but the parliament only started to introduce legislation on party and campaign funding in 1989 and has repeatedly changed the regime since then. This article discusses the basic characteristics and the main developments of the Belgian political finance regime. Four possible explanatory factors mentioned in the literature are discussed: the occurrence of political corruption, changes in party organization, the financing strategies of parties and the geographical or institutional proximity to other political systems. The analysis confirms that the combination of these different factors provides an explanation for the creation of, and subsequent changes to, the political finance system in Belgium. On occasions, one factor prevails, but in general several factors have to be taken into account simultaneously. In addition, Belgium's institutional development - in particular the federalization process - has created an opportunity framework for parties to obtain more state funding ».

CANADA

25. Coletto, David. **Party finance in Canada since 2001.** *Innovations: a Journal of Politics*. Vol. 7, (2007), p. 41-46.

<http://www.ucalgary.ca/innovations/files/innovations/Coletto-PartyFinance.pdf>

« Much like electoral systems, election finance regimes are not benign institutions but central features of a political system that can have significant effects on the nature of democracy within a country. Money impacts the ability of political parties to contest elections and deliver their message to voters. It is an important resource to increase political knowledge and mobilize voters during an election. Therefore, assessing the state of political finance of Canadian political parties is essential to understanding the Canadian political environment ».

26. Feasby, Colin. **Continuing questions in canadian political finance law: third parties and small political parties.** *Alberta Law Review*. Vol. 47, no 4 (june 2010), p. 993-1016.

« Canadian political finance law has struggled with the question of how to treat small political parties and third parties. The author contends that data gathered by Elections Canada concerning third party expenditures over the last four federal elections provides an opportunity to re-evaluate *Harper v. Canada (A.G.)*, which was decided without a strong evidential foundation on the grounds of a reasonable apprehension of harm. The Ontario Court of Appeal's decision in *Longley v. Canada (A.G.)* upholding Canada Elections Act provisions that require political parties to meet vote thresholds to qualify for annual allowances, raises constitutional questions about the role of small political parties. The author questions whether a distinction should be made in law between large and small political parties and whether the fear that third parties may become political parties is a sufficient justification to limit the rights of small political parties ».

27. Fisher, Justin. **State funding of political parties: truths, myths, and legends.** Dans *Money, politics, and democracy. Canada's party finance reforms*. L. Young; H. J. Jansen. Vancouver: UBC Press, 2011, p. 19-36.
324.271'011 M742 2011

« The Canadian party finance reforms of 2003 and 2006 raise some very interesting questions, especially in relation to the adoption of the state subventions as a core method of funding major parties. In particular it taps into two key debates: why certain party funding systems are adopted and what are the wider consequences of any such reforms ».

28. Flanagan, Tom; Coletto, David. **Replacing allowances for Canada's national political parties?** Calgary: The School of Public Policy, University of Calgary, 2010. 15 p. (SPP Briefing Papers).

<http://www.policyschool.ucalgary.ca/sites/default/files/research/flanagan-coletto-online-3.pdf>

« The Conservative government has repeatedly announced its desire to cancel the quarterly allowances paid by Elections Canada to political parties. In this paper, we

examine alternative party finance mechanisms to cope with the revenue loss caused by eliminating the quarterly allowances. American data suggest that introduction of a taxpayer check-off system, as proposed in the 2004 Conservative Party platform, would replace only a small fraction of the revenue lost by cancelling the allowances. Canadian data show that increasing donor limits would also have only a small positive impact. Cancelling the allowances will definitely constrain parties and may force them to limit campaign activities ».

29. Jansen, Harold J.; Young, Lisa. **State subsidies and political parties**. *Options politiques = Policy Options*. Vol. 32, no 9 (october 2011), p. 43-47.
<http://www.irpp.org/po/archive/oct11/jansen.pdf>

« Comme promis, le gouvernement Harper a supprimé dans son budget de juin 2011 l'allocation trimestrielle versée aux partis politiques. Toutefois, celle-ci n'était que l'une des trois formes d'aide financière qui leur est accordée; tous les partis, y compris les conservateurs, restent financièrement très dépendants de l'État. Le débat sur le soutien aux partis politiques ne peut donc se limiter à l'allocation trimestrielle, mais doit englober l'intégralité de l'aide financière qu'ils reçoivent de l'État ».

30. Lambert, Lisa A.; J. Jansen, Harold. **Party building by a state dependent party: the case of the Green Party of Canada**. [S.l.]: [s.n.], 2007. 16 p.
<http://www.cpsa-acsp.ca/papers-2007/Lambert-Jansen.pdf>

Paper presented to the Annual Meeting of the Canadian Political Science Association
Saskatoon, Saskatchewan, May 30 – June 1, 2007

« Recent decades have witnessed an increase in state subsidies to political parties. This trend has led to a debate among both academics and policy-makers about the effects of state subventions on political competition and party organization. One of the central criticisms of subsidies is that they lead parties to centralize and professionalize their operations, leading parties to neglect the development of party membership and mass organization and participation. In this paper, we assess this argument through a case study of the Green Party of Canada (GPC) after 2004. In that election, the GPC qualified for the generous state subsidies established on January 1, 2004 when Bill C-24 came into effect. The Canadian Greens are an emerging political party that is heavily dependent on state funding to finance their operations. As such, they are an ideal case study to examine the extent to which these predictions of the effects of state subsidies are justified. After reviewing the literature on the effects of state subventions on political parties, we will examine the rise of the Green Party and the way it has responded to the incentives to professionalize and centralize their operations. Finally, the paper will assess whether the party's strategy has been electorally successful ».

31. Lambert, Lois Anne (Lisa). **The effects of state subventions to political parties: a case study of the green party of Canada**. Mémoire de maîtrise. [S.l.]: University of Lethbridge, 2007. 128 p.
<https://www.uleth.ca/dspace/bitstream/handle/10133/620/lambert,%20lisa.pdf?sequence=1>

« State subventions to parties have been introduced in many Western democratic states with little discussion about the effect that such payments from a state to a political party have on the party. Political scientists, though, have conducted a lively debate about the effect of these state subventions on parties and party systems. With the introduction of state subventions in Canada, there is a significant opportunity to study the effects of the subsidy on parties. This thesis is a case study of the Green Party of Canada during the first three years after the introduction of state subventions to parties. The Green Party of Canada offers us a unique opportunity to see a party emerge from fringe status with the assistance of a state subvention to the party. There are many important findings we can draw from this party's experience of the state subvention ».

32. Local government elections task force. **Public financing discussion paper**. [S.l.]: [s.n.], 2010. 21 p.
http://www.localelectiontaskforce.gov.bc.ca/library/Public_Financing_Discussion_Paper.pdf

« Public financing of local government elections refers to giving public funding to local government election candidates, local government elector organizations (parties), and contributors. Generally, jurisdictions that use public financing at the local level provide it through reimbursements of candidates' election expenses and/or tax benefits to contributors for political donations. Reimbursements compensate candidates for a portion of their election campaign expenses, while tax benefits, in the form of tax credits or rebates, provide a tax reduction for members of the public who contribute to local government election campaigns ».

33. Loewen, Peter John; Blais, André. **Did Bill C-24 affect voter turnout? Evidence from the 2000 and 2004 elections**. *Revue canadienne de science politique = Canadian Journal of Political Science*. Vol. 39, no 04 (décembre 2006), p. 935-943.
<http://journals.cambridge.org/action/displayFulltext?type=1&fid=594920&jid=CJP&volumeId=39&issueId=04&aid=594916&bodyId=&membershipNumber=&societyETOCSession=>

« En liant les subventions au total des votes obtenus, la loi C-24 modifie substantiellement le financement des partis politiques nationaux au Canada. Ce changement pourrait induire une augmentation de la participation électorale puisque les partis ont intérêt à maximiser le nombre de votes et les électeurs sont davantage incités à voter. Nous examinons cette hypothèse. Nous démontrons que l'influence de l'intensité de la lutte entre les candidates sur la participation électorale n'a pas été différente en 2004 qu'en 2000; que les efforts des candidats n'ont pas été plus intenses en 2004 dans les circonscriptions perdues à l'avance; que la probabilité de s'abstenir ou de renoncer à appuyer un tiers parti n'a pas changé entre 2000 et 2004; et que la décision individuelle de participer à l'élection n'a pas été influencée par des considérations stratégiques allant dans la direction prévue. En conséquence, nous trouvons peu de preuves confirmant l'hypothèse selon laquelle la loi C-24 a favorisé la participation électorale ».

34. Loewen, Peter John; Blais, André. **The quarterly allowance and turnout: old and new evidence**. Dans *Money, politics, and democracy: Canada's party finance reforms*. L. Young; H. J. Jansen. Vancouver: UBC Press, 2011, p. 130-144.

« The most recent Canadian elections were contested under substantially different campaign finance rules than those fought in 2000 and earlier. In the past, parties could solicit donations from a large variety of donors - individuals, corporations, and unions. The donations were without limit. Introduced by Prime Minister Chrétien in the run-up to his resignation, Bill C-24 severely limited such corporate and union donations. It also limited the size of individual donations to any single candidate and in total. In exchange for limiting donations from private sources, C-24 offers parties generous public subsidies, arguably making parties more dependant on state financing than ever before ».

35. Milke, Mark. **Subsidizing separatism in Quebec: public subsidies for political parties.** Winnipeg: Frontier Centre for Public Policy, 2009. 25 p. (FCPP Policy Series: 77).
<http://www.fcpp.org/files/5/PS77%20Subsidizing%20Seperatism.pdf>

36. Milke, Mark. **Taxpayers forced to fund Canada's political parties with \$299 million in political donations.** *Fraser Forum*. (september 2007), p. 23-25.
<http://www.fraserinstitute.org/uploadedFiles/fraser-ca/Content/research-news/research/articles/taxpayers-forced-to-fund-political-parties.pdf>

« The article reports on the issue that taxpayers are forced to fund political parties thru political donations in Canada. To grasp how much extra money has been funneled from the public purse to political parties, data shows that in 12 years between 1988 and 2000, political parties received \$90 million in total from the federal government. For 2004 and 2006 elections, taxpayers handed over \$107 million to five political parties and their candidates ».

37. Seidle, F. Leslie. **Public funding of political parties: the case for further reform.** Dans *Money, politics, and democracy. Canada's party finance reforms*. L. Young; H. J. Jansen. Vancouver: UBC Press, 2011, p. 37-59.
324.271'011 M742 2011

« The main elements of the Canadian regime - reimbursements to parties and candidates, and tax credits for donations - date from 1974. As described in the second section, the level of public funding increased markedly as a result of legislative changes that took effect in 2004, notably the introduction of new annual allowances to parties. The latter were intended to compensate for the new contribution limits that were central to the 2004 reform. [...] The third section addresses further reforms intended to make the public funding regime more accessible to emerging parties, provide incentives to elect more women, and enhance public policy development. The chapter concludes by suggesting that when Parliament reviews the political finance reforms of the last decade, changes to promote these objectives should be on the agenda ».

38. Spano, Sebastian. **Financement public.** Dans *Financement politique*. Ottawa: Bibliothèque du Parlement, 2008, p. 11-12.
<http://www.parl.gc.ca/content/LOP/ResearchPublications/prb0750-f.pdf>

Le chapitre se divise en 3 sections: 1. Remboursement des dépenses électorales; 2. Allocation annuelle pour les partis politiques; 3. Crédit d'impôt pour les donateurs.

39. Thurlow, W. Scott. **Le financement des élections canadiennes**. *Revue parlementaire canadienne* = *Canadian Parliamentary Review*. Vol. 31, no 4 (hiver 2008-2009), p. 29-33.

http://www.revparl.ca/31/4/31n4_08f_Thurlow.pdf

« Au cours de la dernière décennie, une longue suite de changements ont été apportés à la Loi électorale du Canada ainsi qu'aux diverses lois électorales provinciales concernant les contributions financières versées aux candidats et aux partis politiques, sous prétexte d'une plus grande responsabilité. On voulait éloigner l'argent de la politique pour s'assurer que notre système ne soit pas influencé artificiellement par les grosses fortunes ou les grandes sociétés. Que ces restrictions soient constitutionnelles ou non, là n'est pas la question. L'important est de savoir si les changements apportés ont fait une différence dans le discours démocratique et la composition de la Chambre des communes. Il sera ici surtout question de deux changements précis et de leurs répercussions ou non sur le processus électoral ».

40. Young, Lisa; Jansen, Harold J. **Reforming party and election finance in Canada**. Dans *Money, politics, and democracy: Canada's party finance reforms*. L. Young; H. J. Jansen. Vancouver: UBC Press, 2011, p. 1-18.
324.271'011 M742 2011

41. Young, Lisa; Sayers, Anthony; Jansen, Harold J. **Altering the political landscape: state funding and party finance**. Dans *Canadian parties in transition*. 3e ed. A. G. Gagnon; B. Tanguay. (ed.). Peterborough: Broadview Press, 2007, p. 335-354.
JL195 C212 2007 ENAP

ÉTATS-UNIS

42. Brogan, Michael J. **Experiment and institutionalization: clean elections in New Jersey**. *Lex Localis - Journal of Local Self-Government*. Vol. 7, no 4 (octobre 2009), p. 371-392.
<http://search.ebscohost.com/login.aspx?direct=true&db=poh&AN=67010923&lang=fr&sitelte=ehost-live>

« There is not a general consensus among scholars about whether public campaign funding initiatives increase electoral competitiveness. U.S. focused research has found the effects of Clean Election (CE) funding present mixed outcomes (Mayer and Wood 1995; GAO 2003; Mayer, Werner, and Williams 2004; Werner and Mayer 2007) On the one hand, research has found that Clean Election funding creates more competitive elections (Bardwell 2002; Mayer, Werner, and Williams 2004). While on the other, Clean Election funding scholars have found that public funding of state legislative candidates has not caused elections to become more competitive (Mayer and Wood 1995; GAO 2003). One reason for the difference in the research literature is likely a result of the program being in its early years of implementation in the U.S. This paper provides a new technique for estimating the short-term and long-range effects of the program by experimenting on the

New Jersey case which is designed to cope with limited data. It accomplishes this by creating simulated elections that are based on the lessons-learned in Arizona and Maine, as well as on structural constraints present in New Jersey. The experiment's results confirm the impact of Clean Elections is mixed: The impact of Clean Election funding increases intra-party competition but does not increase inter-party competition. Nevertheless, while the impact of Clean Elections does show some encouraging signs for proponents of electoral reform, it is unlikely to transform the electoral landscape by making elections more competitive ».

43. Brogan, Michael J.; Mendilow, Jonathan. **The telescoping effects of public campaign funding: evaluating the impact of clean elections in Arizona, Maine, and New Jersey.** *Politics & Policy*. Vol. 40, no 3 (june 2012), p. 492-518.
<http://search.ebscohost.com/login.aspx?direct=true&db=poh&AN=77350799&lang=fr&site=ehost-live>

« Supporters of public campaign funding say it democratizes the election process; detractors say it fails to meet its intended goals and, in fact, has unexpected negative results. Examining data from Arizona and Maine, which have full public funding, and from New Jersey's 'Clean Election' pilot program, has enabled us to determine empirically if critics are correct. We conclude that neither advocates of Clean Elections nor its detractors are completely accurate. Rather, public campaign funding enhances trends that already existed where it was implemented without sparking new ones ».

44. Esenberg, Richard. **Playing out the string: will public financing of elections survive McComish v. Bennett?** *Election Law Journal*. Vol. 10, no 2 (2011), p. 165-173.
<http://search.ebscohost.com/login.aspx?direct=true&db=poh&AN=63233099&lang=fr&site=ehost-live>

« The article looks into the ramifications of the U.S. Supreme Court case, McComish versus Bennett, whose decision is said to be the future of the public financing of elections in the country. It argues that the distinction of the Supreme Court between expenditures and contributions hinders meaningful public financing. It believes that the Fair Elections Now Act is a serious attempt to challenge those who are dependent on electoral private funding ».

45. Esenberg, Richard M. **The lonely death of public campaign financing.** *Harvard Journal of Law & Public Policy*. Vol. 33, no 1 (winter 2010), p. 283-332.
<http://search.ebscohost.com/login.aspx?direct=true&db=aph&AN=47692851&lang=fr&site=ehost-live>

« The article focuses on public campaign financing law in the U.S. It discusses the evolution of the distinction between contributions and expenditures, and the rationales considered by the U.S. Supreme Court. It also presents the degree of constitutional protection enjoyed by independent expenditures. In addition the effect of independent expenditures through public financing systems is discussed ».

46. Gleason, Annie ; Ferris, Daniel; Eppley, Justin; Godoy, Mucio ; Sumner, Stephen ; Smith, Xavier. **Elections & public financing.** [S.l.]: [s.n.], 2010. 42 p.

http://www.followthemoney.org/press/Reports/Elections_and_Public_Financing.pdf

« Fundraising to run for elected office continues to capture increasing amounts of a candidate's time, even at the state level. Our research indicates that public financing systems can help to reduce the amount of time legislators must devote to fundraising and, thus, spend more time addressing policy issues. Our data also indicates that as these races become closer in terms of money, they also become closer in terms of competitiveness. We find that public financing has a moderate but significant effect on improving the number of races that are competitive in both the state House and the state Senate. We also find that public financing has a strong effect on decreasing the disparity between incumbents and challengers in campaign contributions ».

47. Hamm, Keith E.; Hogan, Robert E. **Candidate perceptions of campaign financing in state legislative elections: preliminary observations.** *Conference Papers -- American Political Science Association.* (2007), p. 1-15.

<http://search.ebscohost.com/login.aspx?direct=true&db=poh&AN=34504740&lang=fr&site=ehost-live>

« How do campaign finance laws shape the attitudes and behaviors of candidates running for the state legislature? This analysis examines how various aspects of campaigns for the state legislature vary across states using different forms of campaign financing. The results demonstrate that low contribution limits reduce the importance of support from financial contributors. However, the stringency is not very related to the types of techniques candidates use to raise funding or to the time candidates allocate to these tasks. There is some evidence that a state's regulatory environment affects candidate perceptions about electoral advantages of certain categories of candidates, beliefs about the severity of problems associated with financing in a given state, and support for public financing as a solution. Overall comparisons of candidate behavior and perceptions across these states demonstrate that the effects of campaign finance laws are not as clear-cut as some have often assumed. Findings from Connecticut where clean election reforms are slated to take effect in the upcoming 2008 election cycle indicate that a high percentage of state legislative candidate plan to accept the available public funding if they decide to run again. Candidate in Connecticut believe that these new laws will have electoral consequences for many categories of candidates as well as for systemic elements of the larger policy process ».

48. La Raja, Raymond J. **Does public funding in state legislative elections encourage citizens to run for office?** [S.l.]: [s.n.], 2009. 41 p. (APSA 2009 Toronto Meeting Paper).

<http://ssrn.com/abstract=1450958>

« This paper examines the potential effect of public financing of campaigns on encouraging citizens to run for office in state legislative elections. Using new data from a survey of community leaders in three states, it examines factors that influence the decision to run for state representative, looking especially at whether the availability of public funds induces strategic candidates to enter a race. The findings indicate that public subsidies are likely to encourage ambitious and quality candidates, but not necessarily those who are most likely to win. Moreover, public subsidies may encourage those who face high “psychic” costs of soliciting campaign contributions, but not necessarily those

have difficulty raising money. There is no evidence that public subsidies will boost candidacies from those in under-represented groups such as women, minorities and low income individuals. It is likely to increase the number of liberal candidates. The implications of these findings are discussed ».

49. La Raja, Raymond J. **The potential effects of public funding on political parties**. [S.l.]: [s.n.], 2006. 8 p.
<http://campfin.polisci.wisc.edu/Conf/LaRaja.pdf>

Prepared for a conference on public financing, January 28-29, 2006, University of Wisconsin Madison.

« In this discussion paper I sketch out briefly some questions related to how public financing of elections may affect political parties, and suggest a research agenda to address such questions. Most of what I discuss relates to state legislatures, though some is applicable to statewide offices. I spend less time outlining research methods than presenting potential questions to explore ».

50. La Raja, Raymond J.; Schaffner, Brian F. **Explaining the unpopularity of public funding for congressional elections**. *Electoral Studies*. Vol. 30, no 3 (september 2011), p. 525-533.
<http://search.ebscohost.com/login.aspx?direct=true&db=aph&AN=65042555&lang=fr&site=ehost-live>

« This article uses data from the 2008 Cooperative Congressional Election Study to explain weak support for public financing of congressional campaigns. Previous studies lack theory to explain variation in support and use a flawed measure of the dependent variable. We argue that low support reflects a failure resulting from a collective action dilemma. Citizens desire a campaign finance system that weans politicians from private donors, but are unwilling to pay a small amount in taxes to support public financing. In contrast to conventional wisdom, we show that support for public financing is highest among those perceived to benefit the most from the current system. Our results suggest that most Americans would rather not pay for politics, and that reform proposals must avoid incurring transparent costs on individual citizens to pay for reform ».

51. Malhotra, Neil. **The impact of public financing on electoral competition: evidence from Arizona and Maine**. *State Politics & Policy Quarterly*. Vol. 8, no 3 (fall 2008), p. 263-281.
<http://www.stanford.edu/~neilm/sppq.pdf>

« The article discusses the public financing of candidates in U.S. elections, examining whether such laws create enhanced competition amongst the candidates. Clean election programs, as such laws are also called, were mandated in both Maine and Arizona in 2000. Topics include challengers who accept public funding, spending limits, the reduced influence of money in American politics, and forgoing private contributions. Also discussed are incumbents entrenched in government bodies and the overall amount of campaign expenditures ».

52. Miller, Michael G. **After the GAO report: what do we know about public election funding?** *Election Law Journal*. Vol. 10, no 3 (2011), p. 273-290.
<http://search.ebscohost.com/login.aspx?direct=true&db=aph&AN=69873734&lang=fr&site=ehost-live>

« In June of 2010, the United States Government Accountability Office (GAO) released a report that evaluates the effects of full public funding in Arizona and Maine. The report seeks to evaluate the policy effects of public funding in the states with regard to several stated goals of its supporters. including slower campaign spending growth, diminished interest group influence, enhanced political participation, and heightened electoral competitiveness. The GAO's paper is timely considering that full funding programs are becoming both more common and more visible to the public at large. The GAO's analysis contains several interesting findings, and its publication marks a good opportunity for political scientists and policy analysts to compare notes. Combining the contributions from each provides a more complete picture of what is known and unknown in the study of publicly funded elections. This article reviews the findings of the GAO report as well as those of a growing number of scholars who have examined the topic. It describes what the GAO, political scientists, and policy analysts have found with regard to public election funding. as well as opportunities that remain for further research. Where applicable, the article supplements this review with basic analysis of additional data. It should therefore be useful both for political scientists and the policy community ».

53. National Conference of State Legislatures. **Public financing of campaigns: an overview.** [Site Web consulté le 8 août 2012].
<http://www.ncsl.org/legislatures-elections/elections/public-financing-of-campaigns-overview.aspx>

« Twenty-five states have programs that provide public funds for use in election campaigns. State public financing programs may be divided into three broad categories: those which provide funds directly to individual candidates, those that provide funds to political parties , and those which provide tax incentive to citizens who make political contributions. Many states operate programs which combine more than one of these categories. Each type is briefly summarized below, and the full array of public financing programs offered by states is detailed in Table 4 ».

54. Prat, Andrea; Puglisi, Riccardo; Snyder, Jr James M. **Is private campaign finance a good thing? Estimates of the potential informational benefits.** *Quarterly Journal of Political Science*. Vol. 5, no 3 (2010), p. 291-318.
<http://search.ebscohost.com/login.aspx?direct=true&db=poh&AN=57155202&lang=fr&site=ehost-live>

« What would happen if the current U.S. campaign finance system, mostly based on private donations, were replaced by a public funding scheme of the same magnitude? Some argue that public funding would deprive voters of useful information, but this can only be true if private donations are somehow targeted to "better" candidates. In this paper, we ask what voters can learn about the "effectiveness" of a legislator from the amount and pattern of contributions received during the campaign. We find that the total amount that a candidate receives is a positive, but weak, predictor of that candidate's

effectiveness. Small contributions provide a strong and positive signal of effectiveness, while large contributions are a negative signal of effectiveness. Contributions from organizations also provide a positive signal, while contributions from individuals, parties, and candidates themselves do not ».

55. Stratmann, Thomas. **The effect of public financing on the competitiveness of elections.** [S.l.]: [s.n.], 2009. 29 p.
<http://ssrn.com/abstract=1400809>

« This paper analyzes the effect of public financing on the competitiveness on elections. It shows that states with public financing have more competitive elections in state assembly races than states without. The paper also analyzes the fortunes of those candidates for the Maine House of Representatives who accept public financing in Maine. The results from this analysis show that accepting public financing increases incumbents' vote share by 2 percentage points and challengers' vote share by 3 percentage points ».

56. Walker Wilson, Molly J. **The new role of the small donor in political campaigns and the demise of public funding.** *Journal of Law & Politics*. Vol. 25, no 3 (summer 2009), p. 257-277.
<http://search.ebscohost.com/login.aspx?direct=true&db=poh&AN=52621681&lang=fr&site=ehost-live>

« The article presents a discussion of U.S. political campaign funding, focusing on the decline of the public funding system and the increasing importance of small donors. The 2008 presidential election is analyzed as an example of this trend. The Democratic candidate, Barack Obama, chose to decline public funding for the general election, due to his ability to raise more money from small donors using the internet. It is noted that Republican presidential candidate George W. Bush had previously declined public funding twice in primary elections, as had Democratic candidate John Kerry in 2004. Criticisms of the public funding system are analyzed ».

57. Werfel, Seth. **A modern paradigm for campaign finance: economic markets and lessons from history.** *Politics & Policy*. Vol. 36, no 5 (october 2008), p. 776-790.
<http://search.ebscohost.com/login.aspx?direct=true&db=poh&AN=34504379&lang=fr&site=ehost-live>

« Campaign finance is a perennially contentious issue in American politics, with increased significance in the upcoming presidential election. Historically, legislation has attempted to balance the corrupting effects of money in politics with the Constitutional right to free speech. This article argues for a modern paradigm of market-based reform that relaxes controls on the supply of money and aims to limit the demand for private contributions. Specifically, this model introduces affordable government vouchers and secret donation booths, adapted to further expand consumer choice and increase incentives for political participation. Ultimately, applying principles of the market to campaign finance reform will enhance political efficacy and strengthen American democracy ».

58. Werner, Timothy; Mayer, Kenneth R. **Public election funding, competition, and candidate gender**. *PS: Political Science & Politics*. Vol. 40, no 04 (2007), p. 661-667.
<http://dx.doi.org/10.1017/S1049096507071053>

« In 2000, Arizona and Maine implemented full public funding for state legislative elections, and Connecticut will do so in 2008. Candidates who opt to accept public funding receive grants that pay for the entire cost of their campaigns. Advocates of these so-called clean elections argue that the programs reduce quid pro quo corruption, increase electoral competitiveness, and open up the process to candidates who lack access to traditional fundraising networks (Phelps 2004). Critics respond that the Maine and Arizona public funding programs have achieved nothing, save for imposing unjust burdens on candidates who refuse to participate (Basham and Zelder 2005) ».

ÉTUDES COMPARATIVES OU GÉNÉRALES

59. ACE réseau du savoir électoral. **Financement public direct et indirect**. [Site Web consulté le 10 août 2012].
<http://aceproject.org/ace-fr/topics/pc/pca/pca02/pca02a>

Page webs disponibles sur le site: Avantages et désavantages du financement public des partis politiques et des candidats ; Financement public indirect des partis et candidats ; Répartition du financement public direct; Versement du financement public direct ; Financement public direct et indirect ; L'usage du financement public direct.

60. Boatright, Robert G. **The end of the campaign finance reform era?** [S.l.]: [s.n.], 2011. 28 p.
http://www.clarku.edu/departments/politicalscience/pdfs/Boatright_epsa.pdf

« The United States and Canada enacted similar campaign finance reform laws during the early years of the 2000s. Both nations' recent elections were influenced by calls from the political right to repeal major pieces of these laws. In this article I analyze the role campaign finance regulation played in these elections, I assess the consequences from the early-decade reforms for these elections' results, and I speculate on the future of regulation in both nations ».

61. Boatright, Robert G. **Interest group adaptations to campaign finance reform in Canada and the United States**. *Revue canadienne de science politique = Canadian Journal of Political Science*. Vol. 42, no 1 (mars 2009), p. 17-43.
<http://search.ebscohost.com/login.aspx?direct=true&db=aph&AN=52842695&lang=fr&site=ehost-live>

« Au début des années 2000, les États-Unis et le Canada ont promulgué des lois similaires visant la réforme du financement des campagnes électorales. Cet article est basé sur des entretiens avec les chefs des principaux groupes d'intérêt canadiens. Il étudie les ressemblances et les différences entre leurs réponses à ces réformes et celles des groupes d'intérêt américains. Même si les groupes des deux pays ont tous insisté sur la communication et la mobilisation de leurs membres, les réformes canadiennes ont mieux réussi à éliminer entièrement plusieurs groupes des campagnes électorales. Cette

différence s'explique surtout par la structure différente des deux systèmes de partis politiques et par l'évolution historique des groupes d'intérêt dans ces deux pays ».

62. Casas-Zamora, Kevin. **Political finance and State funding systems: an overview**. [S.l.]: Brooking Institution / University of Costa Rica, 2008. 33 p.
http://216.65.11.186/~media/Files/Publications/Money%20and%20Politics/Research%20and%20Publications/Reports%20and%20Papers/English/PoliticalFinanceAndStateFundingSystems_English.pdf

« Most of the paper will be devoted to the analysis of State subsidies for parties and candidates, by far the most widespread political finance regulation instrument amongst contemporary democracies, as well as one of the most laden with expectations and controversies. An attempt will be made to extract a few practical lessons as to the likely political effects of State funding and its limits as a lever to change political finance realities. In the document's final section, these lessons will be broadened to encompass a few reflections about the limits of political finance reform in general and the vital importance of embracing a realistic approach in the hard road towards cleaner and more equitable politics ».

63. Casas-Zamora, Kevin; Walecki, Marcin; Faruk Genckaya, Omer; Ammar, Dina; Sarkis, Chantal ; Ekmekji, Karma; Elobaid, Elobaid Ahmed. **Public funding solutions for political parties in muslim-majority societies**. Washington: International foundation for electoral systems (IFES), 2009. 123 p.
<http://www.ifes.org/~media/Files/Publications/ManualHandbook/2009/1497/PublicFundingSolutionsforPoliticalPartiesinMuslim%20MajoritySocieties.pdf>

Part I. «Public funding in established and transitional democracies ».

Part II. « Public funding of political parties: the case of Turkey»; « Public funding of political parties: the case of Egypt »; « Public funding of political parties: the case of Lebanon »; « Public funding of political parties: the case of Morocco ».

Part III. « Public Funding Opportunities - Conditions, Constraints, and possible outcomes ».

64. Crone, Stephen. **Reforming political party funding in the UK: lessons from Canada**. [S.l.]: [s.n.], 2011. 9 p.
<http://filestore.democraticaudit.com/file/36b48a0f0ff1cea52fdc30529fed04e4-1314701140/lessons-from-canada---stephen-crone.pdf>

« Through exploring the facets of the Canadian system, this paper seeks to present a fair assessment of its merits, while at the same time using Canadian experience to answer a number of questions which bear upon the current UK reform agenda. My analysis is presented in three parts. The first section of the paper offers a brief history of the Canadian regulatory framework; the second separates myths and realities about the current system; whilst the third identifies practical issues which make it difficult for the UK to adopt the Canadian approach to reform. The final section offers some brief concluding thoughts ».

65. Gauja, Anika. **The public funding of election campaigns and political parties.** Dans *Political parties and elections*. A. Gauja. Surrey: Ashgate, 2010, p. 141-163.
342.27 G268 2010

« In this chapter I present a comparative analysis of the extent to which states support the activities of political parties through the provision of public funding. The first section of the chapter analyses the theoretical explanations provided in the political science literature for the emergence of public funding as a significant resource for political parties and the consequent impact this has had on parties' organizational capacities. Secondly, the chapter outlines the various comparative regimes that exist to provide public funding for parties' activities in election campaigns ».

66. International institute for democracy and election assistance (IDEA). **Political finance database: public funding.** [Site Web consulté le 10 août 2012].
<http://www.idea.int/political-finance/public-funding.cfm>

« Questions 19-28 cover the provision of direct and indirect public funding to political parties and candidates. Advocates of public funding argue that such measures can counteract the negative influence of private money in politics, help to strengthen the capacity of political parties and level the electoral playing field. Critics argue that public funds may weaken the ties between parties and their supporters. First, questions 19-22 ask whether direct public funding exists, and if so what the eligibility and allocation criteria are and whether there are provisions for how such funds should be used. Questions 23-26 deal with the provision of free or subsidised media access to political parties and candidates, and if any other forms of public funding is provided. Questions 27-28 ask if financial incentives are provided to increase gender equality among candidates and within political parties in general ».

67. Nassmacher, Karl-Heinz. **The funding of party competition : political finance in 25 democracies.** Baden-Baden: Nomos, 2009. 467 p.
JF2112 C28 N37 2009 Université McGill

« Has money in politics become more important over time? Has new campaign technology caused a 'cost explosion'? Who gives and spends for political purposes and why? Is illegal funding of parties a real problem? What are the impacts of public funding for sustainable democracy? The Funding of Party Competition examines these questions, and the result is a major contribution to scholarly research on party democracy and on democracy building. As political finance is a restless issue, detailed findings on the impact of legal regulations are important for policy-makers. This comprehensive monograph by the renowned expert Karl-Heinz Nassmacher covers all aspects of political finance in modern democracies. The reader is given all information that is presently available on: the factual patterns of party spending ¥ the causes of an allegedly high level and increase of political spending ¥ the various sources of political funds and strategies of fundraising ¥ the impacts of funding on party organization, party types and party systems ».

68. Ohman, Magnus. **The provision of public funding.** Dans *Political finance regulations around the world : an overview of the International IDEA database*. Stockholm: International Institute for Democracy and Electoral Assistance, 2012, p. 23-32.
<http://www.idea.int/publications/political-finance-regulations/upload/Political-Finance-Regulations-Overview-of-IDEA-database.pdf>

« These questions all deal with the direct and indirect provision of state resources to political parties and candidates, including questions about provisions relating to gender equality. [...] Key findings: 68 per cent (116 countries) have provisions for direct public funding to political parties, although the figure varies from 27 per cent of countries in Oceania to 86 per cent of European countries. 69 per cent of all countries provide political parties with free or subsidised media access, with Africa standing out as the continent with the largest focus on such assistance ».

69. Öhman, Magnus. **A brief introduction to public funding of political parties and election campaigns.** [S.l.]: [s.n.], 2011. 13 p.
[http://magnusohman.net/attachments/File/A brief introduction to public funding of political parties and election campaigns.pdf](http://magnusohman.net/attachments/File/A%20brief%20introduction%20to%20public%20funding%20of%20political%20parties%20and%20election%20campaigns.pdf)

« This document presents a brief introduction to the issue of public funding. It will concentrate on support provided to political parties, but public funding can also be provided to candidates or to other groups that engage in the political process. In addition, most of the data presented in this paper refers to the provision of direct public funding (money), but the paper also discusses the provision of indirect public funding (such as free services or tax relief). Public funding is defined as the regulated provision of government (state) resources to eligible political stakeholders ».

70. Öhman, Magnus. **Global trends in the regulation of political finance.** [S.l.]: International foundation for electoral system, 2011. 23 p. (IFES Conference Paper).
http://www.ifes.org/Content/Publications/News-in-Brief/2011/Feb/~media/Files/Publications/White%20PaperReport/2011/IPSA_conference_paper_ohman.pdf

« This paper deals with the role of money in politics, and in particular with certain efforts by countries around the world to regulate this role. [...] Different ways have been sought to oversee and regulate political finance, and the purpose of this paper is to review recent and current trends in political finance regulation. [...] This paper is limited to two areas, namely disclosure requirements and the provision of direct public funding, and focus is given to political parties rather than candidates for public election ».

71. Öhman, Magnus. **Solutions pratiques concernant le financement public des partis politiques et des campagnes électorales.** Dans *Réglementation applicable au financement politique : l'expérience mondiale*. M. Öhman; H. Zainulbhai. Ed. Washington: IFES, 2009, p. 52-90.
http://www.ifes.org/~media/Files/Publications/Books/2009/Political%20Finance%20Regulation%20The%20Global%20Experience/Political_Finance_Regulation_the_Global_Experience_in_French.pdf

« Ce chapitre définira les variables-clés dans la mise à disposition d'un financement public pour les systèmes multipartites, et s'attachera à identifier les recommandations sur ce qu'il convient de garder à l'esprit au moment d'impulser des réformes dans le domaine du financement public. L'étude tient compte des grandes différences entre les régions et les pays, et ne prescrit pas de solution unique.[...] Cette étude permettra également d'interroger les moyens par lesquels certains régimes ont cherché à utiliser le financement public des partis politiques pour renforcer leur propre position plutôt qu'encourager le pluralisme politique ».

72. Van Biezen, Ingrid. **State intervention in party politics: the public funding and regulation of political parties.** *European Review*. Vol. 16, no 3 (july 2008), p. 337-353.
<http://search.ebscohost.com/login.aspx?direct=true&db=poh&AN=33051535&lang=fr&site=ehost-live>

« This article is concerned with a closer investigation of the growing tendency for the state to intervene in contemporary party politics. It examines two trends. First, it looks more closely at the increased levels of regulation of party activity and behaviour in European democracies, discussing the empirical practice as well as the underlying normative paradigms of party regulation. Second, it examines the increased availability of public funding to political parties from a comparative perspective, while also exploring the motivations for its introduction in light of particular understandings of party democracy. It is argued that both dimensions constitute part of the way in which parties have strengthened their linkages with the state in recent years, and that parties, as a result of the increased involvement of the state in their internal affairs and external behaviour, have become increasingly defined as public utilities or semi-state agencies ».

FRANCE

73. Camby, Jean-Pierre. **2007 : le financement des campagnes électorales.** *Revue du droit public et de la science politique en France et à l'étranger*. Vol. 123, no 1 (janvier-février 2007), p. 21-31.

« Il est traditionnel de dire que si la démocratie n'a pas de prix, elle a cependant un coût. Celui-ci est souvent négligé par le citoyen les dépenses sont considérées comme inéluctables et, plus souvent encore, mal connu, puisque composé d'éléments très hétérogènes. Pourtant, au-delà du coût mécaniquement induit par une élection, il existe en réalité des facteurs impliquant de fortes variations, à commencer par celui du nombre de candidats. Les règles financières relatives aux campagnes électorales, désormais largement connues et respectées, joueront naturellement un grand rôle, d'autant qu'elles incitent aux candidatures plutôt qu'elles ne les entravent. Le coût des campagnes est, largement, neutralisé pour les candidats et les partis politiques, pour lesquels les résultats des élections législatives sont, en outre, une source de financement. Il est, en revanche, pris en charge par des dotations publiques ».

74. Colliard, Jean-Claude. **Le financement des campagnes électorales et le contrôle des comptes de campagne.** *Regards sur l'actualité*. No 329 (mars 2007), p. 53-64.

« Depuis 1998 le financement de la vie politique a été inséré dans un cadre législatif qui comprend, outre le financement public des partis politiques, une réglementation précise des aspects financiers d'une campagne électorale, ce pour la totalité des élections politiques, autres que sénatoriales. Les idées principales sont le plafonnement des dépenses électorales et le remboursement forfaitaire par l'État d'une partie de celles-ci: cela entraîne une réglementation tant des dépenses que des recettes et des mécanismes de contrôles dans lesquels une autorité administrative indépendante, le CNCCFP (Commission nationale des comptes de campagne et des financements politiques) joue un rôle essentiel ».

75. Palmer, Edith. **Campaign finance: France**. [Site Web consulté le 5 juillet 2012].

<http://www.loc.gov/law/help/campaign-finance/france.php>

« Official electoral campaigns in France are very brief. Campaign finance is strictly regulated. All forms of paid commercial advertisements through the press or by any audiovisual means are prohibited during the three months preceding the election. Instead, political advertisements are aired free of charge on an equal basis for all of the candidates on national television channels and radio stations during the official campaign. Campaign donations and expenditures are capped. Candidates must appoint an independent financial representative to handle all their financial matters relating to the election. Campaign accounts are audited by a special commission. Candidates whose campaign accounts are certified may be reimbursed up to 50 percent of their expenses by the state if they meet certain conditions ».

QUÉBEC

76. Benoît, Maude. **L'évolution du financement des partis politiques au Québec de 1977 à aujourd'hui**. Québec: [s.n.], 2007. 80 p.

Aussi disponible à l'adresse suivante:

<http://www.fondationbonenfant.qc.ca/stages/essais/2007Benoit.pdf>

A11A8 F652 B45 2007

Mémoire présenté dans le cadre du stage parlementaire de la Fondation Jean-Charles Bonenfant de l'Assemblée nationale du Québec.

« Suite à une présentation générale du contexte historique et institutionnel du financement des partis politiques au Québec (Partie I), nous procédons à l'analyse de l'émergence, de la formulation et de la mise en oeuvre de la Loi régissant le financement des partis politiques et modifiant la Loi électorale lors de sa création en 1977 (Partie II). Finalement, nous nous penchons sur l'évolution du financement des partis politique de 1977 à aujourd'hui (Partie III), en effectuant une analyse des rapports financiers des trente dernières années qui nous permettra d'évaluer la réussite ou non des objectifs à l'origine de la législation ».

77. Dupaul, Bianka. **Non au financement des partis par les entreprises**. Dans *L'État du Québec 2011*. M. Fahmy. (sous la dir.). Montréal: Boréal, 2011, p. 187-189.

971.404 A613q 2011

78. Groupe de réflexion sur le financement des partis politiques. **Le financement public (étatique)**. Dans *Rapport du groupe de réflexion sur le financement des partis politiques*. [S.l.]: Directeur général des élections, 2007, p. 41-56.
http://www.electionsquebec.qc.ca/documents/pdf/reflexion_financement.pdf.
79. Guay, Jean-Herman. **Mythes et réalité du financement des partis politiques**. Dans *L'État du Québec 2011*. M. Fahmy (dir.). (sous la dir.). Montréal: Éditions du Boréal, 2011, p. 183-192.
971.404 A613q 2011
80. Lessard-Blais, Pierre. **Portrait des Clean Elections aux États-Unis et réflexion sur leur application au Québec**. Québec: [s.n.], 2010. 49 p.
Aussi disponible en format électronique à l'adresse suivante:
http://www.bibliotheque.assnat.qc.ca/DepotNumerique_v2/AffichageFichier.aspx?idf=35526
A11A8 F652 L481 2010

« Le mode Clean Elections est un système de financement public des candidats électoraux alternatif au financement privé. Il est octroyé lorsqu'un nombre minimal de citoyens appuie officiellement le candidat. Premièrement, cet essai brosse le portrait des différents modes Clean Elections aux États-Unis, leurs réussites, leurs lacunes et leurs défis. Deuxièmement, nous établissons des pistes de réflexion sur son potentiel d'implantation au Québec. Quels seraient les principaux défis de l'implantation du mode Clean Elections au Québec, à quel point les enjeux états-uniens s'appliquent au Québec et quelles seraient les questions auxquelles nous aurions à répondre si les Québécois décidaient d'utiliser un tel système de financement de candidats électoraux? L'application du mode Clean Elections au Québec aurait plusieurs impacts sur le système politique québécois. Cet essai aborde particulièrement les sujets du financement des partis politiques, du multipartisme, de l'engagement citoyen, du système électoral et des finances publiques ».
81. Massicotte, Louis. **Financing parties at the grass-roots level: the Québec experience**. Dans *Party funding and campaign financing in international perspective*. S. Issacharoff; K. D. Ewing. Oxford: Hart publishing, 2006, p. 153-180.
JF2112 C28 P37 2006 Université McGill
82. Pelletier, Réjean; Montigny, Éric. **Le financement des partis: quand l'argent est le nerf de la guerre**. Dans *Partis politiques québécois dans la tourmente*. R. Pelletier. Québec: Presses de l'Université Laval, 2012, p. 41-67.
324.2714 P273po 2012
83. Québec (Province). Assemblée nationale. Commission permanente des institutions. **Jury citoyen sur le financement des partis politiques : verdict et recommandations**. [Québec (Province)]: s.n., 2010. 10 p.
http://www.bibliotheque.assnat.qc.ca/DepotNumerique_v2/AffichageNotice.aspx?idn=13079

84. Committee on Standards in Public Life. **Elements of a possible solution: public funding.** Dans *Political party finance: ending the big donor culture*. London: The Committee on Standards in Public Life, 2011, p. 59-62.

http://www.public-standards.gov.uk/Library/13th_Report_Political_party_finance_FINAL_PDF_VERSION_18_11_11.pdf

85. Fisher, Justin. **Hayden Philips and Jack Straw: the continuation of british exceptionalism in party finance?** *Parliamentary Affairs*. Vol. 62, no 2 (april 2009), p. 298-317.

<http://search.ebscohost.com/login.aspx?direct=true&db=aph&AN=39460851&lang=fr&site=ehost-live>

« The former Prime Minister's review of party-funding reforms, chaired by Sir Hayden Phillips, reported in March 2007. It was followed in June 2008 by a White Paper from the Ministry of Justice. This article considers these proposals in the context of both previous reforms in Britain and trends in party-funding reform across the rest of Europe. It seeks to establish whether these proposals represent continuity in the British case, and the extent to which Britain arguably remains 'exceptional' in terms of party funding. It concludes that the Phillips review represented a potential partial break from British exceptionalism, whilst the White Paper represents a continuation. Both, however, provide further evidence of the fragility of the cartel model in respect of Britain ».

86. Gay, Oonagh; White, Isobel; Kelly, Richard. **Public funding.** Dans *The funding of political parties*. London: House of Commons library, 2007, p. 8-18. (Research paper: 34).

<http://www.bibliotheque.assnat.qc.ca/01/mono/2008/02/962077.pdf>

« Parties in the United Kingdom are not entitled to large-scale public funding, as in many other comparable democracies. However, this section lists the various grants which are payable from public funds ».

87. Wilks-Heeg, Stuart. **Funding UK political parties a democratic dilemma.** *Political Insight*. Vol. 2, no 1 (april 2011), p. 22-25.

« Reform of party funding is back on the agenda, but what are the prospects for change when most past attempts at reform have ended in failure? Stuart Wilks-Heeg considers the options and ask who should pay for these democratically essential, but often unpopular, organisations ».

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