



Discipline de parti
2005-2011

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par

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ALLEMAGNE

1. Becher, Michael; Sieberer, Ulrich. **Discipline, electoral rules and defection in the [German] Bundestag, 1983-94.** *German Politics*. Vol. 17, no 3, p. 293-304.

« This article examines how party discipline and legislators' individual policy goals induced by electoral rules influence the likelihood of defections from the party line in the Bundestag. Using a new indicator based on legislators' explanations of their voting behavior we find strong evidence that discipline, not policy cohesiveness alone, drives party unity. In particular, the allocation of offices by the party leadership significantly affects legislators' propensity to defect from the position of their party. First, holding an executive office reduces legislators' probability to defect by approximately 19 per cent. Second, parliamentary office also reduces legislators' probability to defect, although the effect is smaller. District legislators are not generally more prone to defect, but their propensity to defect increases if electoral competition increases. »

2. Davidson-Schmich, Louise K. **The development of party discipline in new parliaments: Eastern German State legislatures 1990-2000.** Dans *Cohesion and Discipline in Legislatures: Political Parties, Party Leadership, Parliamentary Committees and Governance*. R. Y. Hazan. London: Routledge, 2006, p. 88-101. (Library of legislative studies).

« While it has long been observed in western Europe that deputies from the same party caucus generally take identical positions when legislative votes are taken, the explanation for this commonly occurring party voting agreement is controversial. The sociological approach argues that MPs hold together for normative reasons while the institutionalist tradition argues that discipline emerges as rational actors discover self-interested reasons to vote en bloc. The creation of democratic state legislatures in post-communist eastern Germany provides an opportunity to investigate the origins of party voting agreement. There, institutions conducive to high party voting agreement were extended to a region where political elites did not share norms conducive to party cohesion. This article examines the development of legislative voting in eastern Germany between 1990 and 2000. The examination shows that, while antiparty sentiment may have initially complicated the task of developing cohesive parliamentary parties, over the past decade institutional incentives have created high levels of party voting akin to those in western Germany. »

3. Davidson-Schmich, Louise K. **The Origins of Party Discipline.** *German Politics & Society*. Vol. 24, no 2 (Summer 2006), p. 23-43.

« The article discusses the origins of party discipline in Eastern Germany. It presents an outline of the institutional mechanisms developed to promote party voting. It provides an analysis of the rise of party voting in eastern German state legislatures. It concludes that the logic of parliamentary government created disciplined parliamentary party groups (PPG) in the new German parliaments. »

4. Patzelt, Werner J. **Party cohesion and party discipline in German parliaments.** Dans *Cohesion and Discipline in Legislatures: Political Parties, Party Leadership, Parliamentary Committees and Governance*. R. Y. Hazan. London: Routledge, 2006, p. 102-115. (Library of legislative studies).

« Government imposition of restrictive rules is a fact of life in parliamentary democracies. In a novel data set for the study of the parliamentary passage of legislation (SPPL) in western Europe no less than 80 of 512 bills were enacted by some kind of restrictive rule across 17 parliamentary systems. These highly variegated restrictions consist of two distinct types: rules governing amendment control and restrictions on the timetable. Both types of restrictive rules are frequently employed to create 'party discipline by default' in incohesive parties. Referring to formalised rational-choice theories of parliamentary behaviour, seven empirically testable hypotheses are derived and subsequently subjected, with bills as units of analysis, to logistic regression of the likelihood of restrictions being imposed. Of the seven hypotheses, two are rejected and five confirmed. »

AUSTRALIE

5. McKeown, Deirdre; Lundie, Rob; Woods, Guy. **Conscience Votes in the Federal Parliament since 1996.** *Australian Parliamentary Review*. Vol. 23, no 1, p. 172-194.

« In this paper we consider aspects of conscience votes in the period since 1996. We do not attempt to draw conclusions but rather to track patterns in these votes that have occurred under the Howard government. The aspects considered include voting patterns of party leaders and the party vote, the vote of women, the media and conscience votes and dilemmas facing MPs in these votes. »

6. Pringle, Helen. **The Greatest Heights of Parliament? Conscience Votes and the Quality of Parliamentary Debate.** Vol. 23, no 1, p. 195-202.

« The major parties in Australia rarely permit their parliamentary representatives to vote according to conscience, that is, outside the sanction of party discipline. [...] When the possibility of a sanctioned conscience vote does arise in Australian parliaments, there is often opposition by the leaders of the major parties. However, it has been generally if not universally accepted that parliamentary votes on abortion (and associated reproductive matters) should be conducted outside of party policy and discipline. [...] The Commonwealth parliamentary deliberation on ministerial power in regard to RU486 which took place in late 2005 and early 2006 is the specific example of sanctioned conscience voting used in this paper. »

7. Ross, Kerry; Dodds, Susan; Ankeny, Rachel A. **A Matter of Conscience? The Democratic Significance of 'Conscience Votes' in Legislating Bioethics in Australia.** *Australian Journal of Social Issues*. Vol. 44, no 2 (Winter 2009), p. 121-144.

« In Australia, members of a political party are expected to vote as a block on the instructions of their party. Occasionally a 'conscience vote' (or 'free vote') is allowed, which releases parliamentarians from the obligation to maintain party discipline and permits them to vote according to their 'conscience.' In recent years Australia has had a number of conscience votes in federal Parliament, many of which have focused on bioethical issues (e.g., euthanasia, abortion, RU486, and embryonic/stem cell research and cloning). This paper examines the use of conscience votes in six key case studies in these contested areas of policy-making, with particular attention to their implications for promoting democratic values and the significance of women's Parliamentary participation. »

8. Warhurst, John. **Conscience Voting in the Australian Federal Parliament** *Australian Journal of Politics & History*. Vol. 54, no 4 (December 2008), p. 579-596.

« This article examines the merits of conscience voting and the historical record of parties imposing discipline when matters of individual conscience are raised in the Australian federal parliament. It examines three examples of conscience voting in which legislators were freed from their normal obligation to vote as their party requires. These involved bills to do with euthanasia, research involving embryonic stem cells, and the abortion drug RU486 — all issues posing parliamentarians with difficult questions of personal morality and highlighting the contentious intersection between religion and politics. Voting records on these bills are examined in detail as is the interaction, once party discipline was removed, between the voting decision and residual party loyalty, gender and religious affiliation. Although parties allowed legislators to vote according to their conscience, party differences remained apparent. However, gender and religious variables did challenge majority party opinion. Conscience voting remains the exception rather than the rule in the Australian parliament. Party leaders on both sides prefer predictable outcomes and to retain executive control of the legislative process. »

AUTRES PAYS

9. Andeweg, Rudy; Thomassen, Jacques. **Pathways to party unity: Sanctions, loyalty, homogeneity and division of labour in the Dutch parliament.** *Party Politics*. Vol. 17, no 5, p. 655-672.

« The study of party unity and its determinants is conceptually confusing, with terms such as 'party discipline' and 'party cohesion' used to denote both dependent and independent variables. Moreover, while the literature recognizes both anticipated sanctions and homogeneity of preferences as pathways to party unity, it ignores possibilities such as party loyalty and the division of labour within parliamentary parties. The article examines these different pathways to party unity on the basis of five waves of interviews with nearly all members of the Lower House of the Dutch parliament. The article finds least evidence for sanctions as a major determinant of party unity, with the possible exception of parties in the governing coalition. Homogeneity, loyalty and division of labour all seem to play an important role. Party unity might seem over determined, but the more likely explanation offered is that it is a case of 'different horses for different courses'. »

10. Clark, Terry D.; Martinaitis, Zilvinas; Dilba, Ramunas. **Electoral mandate and party cohesion: does it matter in Lithuania?** *Journal of Communist Studies and Transition Politics*. Vol. 24, no 3, p. 317-337.

« Legislators elected on a party-list vote (proportional representation system) are ostensibly more disciplined than those elected in single-seat district contests. However, previous efforts to test this hypothesis in cross-national studies have led to ambiguous results, as contextual factors were found to be at least as important as the type of mandate. In the case of Lithuania, which has adopted a mixed electoral system, the behavior in 962 roll-call votes between 2003 and 2006 reveals that deputies from single-seat constituencies, rather than deputies elected on party lists, are more disciplined in the Lithuanian Seimas. This unexpected finding may be related to the peculiar dynamics of mixed electoral systems. »

11. Dandoy, Regis. **Parliamentary Questions in Belgium: Testing for Party Discipline.** *The Journal of Legislative Studies*. Vol. 17, no 3, p. 315-326.

« This contribution seeks to explain the numbers of written questions in the Belgian House of Representatives (1995–2007). Important variations over time, party and coalition formula have been observed and ‘classic’ explanations – such as the size of the parliamentary party group, the linguistic group or the majority vs. opposition status of the party – only partly explain these observed variations. It is argued here that parliamentary party group unity and discipline is an important factor in shaping patterns of questioning. The findings of the statistical analysis confirm that disciplined and cohesive parties are more active in questioning the government than other parties. »

12. Giannetti, Daniela; Laver, Michael. **Party cohesion, party discipline and party factions in Italy.** Dans *Intra-Party Politics and Coalition Government*. D. Giannetti; K. B. New York: Routledge, 2009, p. 146-168. (Routledge/ECPR in European Political Science).

« Long introduction into the problem of unified parties as a bottom-up phenomenon (cohesion) or top-down phenomenon (discipline), with long asides into conditional party government arguments. In the end, they show that different factions within Italy's DS can be identified based on discourses in party conventions. They also show that when one looks at divisive issues for the party (basically, foreign affairs votes in Italy's parliament), then it is obvious that the party is not unified, and a faction vote can be fathomed. »

13. Heller, William B.; Mershon, Carol. **Dealing in Discipline: Party Switching and Legislative Voting in the Italian Chamber of Deputies, 1988-2000.** *American Journal of Political Science*. Vol. 52, no 4, p. 910-925.

« Compared to U.S. political parties, parties in Italy (and Europe generally) are quite cohesive. Rarely do members of parliament vote against their copartisans in legislative

divisions. Yet in Italy in recent years, legislators switch parties with seeming abandon. Between 1996 and spring 2000, one out of four deputies in the Chamber of Deputies switched parties at least once, compared to only 20 switches in the U.S. Congress from 1947 to 1997 (Nokken 2000). We examine the relationship between switching and observed party unity in Italy by focusing on individual legislators' switching decisions and voting behavior. Overall, switchers move out of highly disciplined parties, suggesting that they switch partly in order to escape strong discipline. »

14. Kunicova, Jana; Remington, Thomas Frederick. **Mandates, parties and dissent: effect of electoral rules on parliamentary party cohesion in the Russian State Duma, 1994-2003.** *Party Politics*. Vol. 14, no 5, p. 555-574.

« Russia's mixed electoral system offers an excellent opportunity to study the effects of electoral rules on party discipline in legislative voting. Under the rules in force from the 1993 to 2003 elections, one half of the Russian Duma's members were elected on party lists, while the remaining half were elected by plurality vote in single-member districts (SMDs). The existing literature has found inconclusive evidence for the direction and magnitude of the effect of such mandate-type differences on the level of party discipline in floor voting. Using a comprehensive database of electronically recorded votes in the Duma in the period between 1994 and 2003 and a panel data structure, we examine the influence of this hybrid system on factional voting cohesion for votes on budget bills. »

15. Leston-Bandeira, Cristina. **Dissent in a party-based parliament: the Portuguese case.** *Party Politics*. Vol. 15, no 6, p. 695-713.

« With a focus on the Portuguese case, this article shows how MPs express disagreement with their parties in a highly cohesive and party-dominated parliament. We review the features that explain why the Portuguese institutional framework reinforces party control over the parliamentary mandate and discuss the different ways Portuguese MPs express party dissent. In the last section, we analyze data on voting for a period of just over 30 years. Contrary to what the literature tells us, Portuguese MPs have been breaching voting discipline regularly since 1976. »

16. Lindsey, David. **A Brief History of Conscience Voting in New Zealand.** *Australasian Parliamentary Review*. Vol. 23, no 1, p. 144-171.

« This paper discusses the use of conscience voting, principally with reference to New Zealand. In Part 1, the nature of conscience voting is addressed, a discussion that is sufficiently generic to be applicable to a number of parliamentary systems. In Part 2, the focus turns to the history and use of conscience voting in New Zealand. »

17. Lotshwao, Kebapetse. **The Lack of Internal Party Democracy in the African National Congress: A Threat to the Consolidation of Democracy in South Africa.** *Journal of Southern African Studies*. Vol. 35, no 4 (December 2009), p. 901-914.

« This article argues that the lack of internal democracy within the African National Congress (ANC) is a threat to the consolidation of South African democracy. The ANC has leadership elections but few other elements of internal party democracy. There is a centralised style of leadership in which the National Executive Committee (NEC) or even individual leaders dominate decision-making to the exclusion of the membership and lower party structures, and there is still an adherence to Leninist principles such as 'democratic centralism' and the need for 'absolute party discipline' on the part of party members. Coupled with an intolerance of debate and dissent by the leadership, these features stifle debate of important issues and policies. Thus, bad decisions by the leadership cannot be checked within the party before becoming public policy. Since lower structures and the general membership are deprived of an opportunity to influence public policies, the government in some instances becomes unresponsive to the people's needs. Democratic centralism and the absolute party discipline required from ANC members deployed in various state institutions, especially parliament, weakens their ability to provide oversight over the executive or influence public policy that contradicts the party line. »

18. Nemoto, Kuniaki; Krauss, Ellis; Pekkanen, Robert. **Policy Dissension and Party Discipline: The July 2005 Vote on Postal Privatization in Japan.** *British Journal of Political Science*. Vol. 38, no 3, p. 499-525.

« This article examines party discipline and party cohesion or defection, offering as an illustration the rebellion over postal privatization in 2005 by members of Japan's Liberal Democratic Party (LDP). It explores the importance of party rules -- especially the seniority rule and policy specialization for district rewards -as intervening variables between election rules and party defection in a decentralized and diverse party. It is argued that in such cases, party rules like seniority can help prevent defection. »

19. Rahaman, Muhammad Mustafizur. **La discipline de parti et la réforme démocratique au Japon.** *Revue parlementaire canadienne*. Vol. 29, no 4 (Hiver 2006-2007), p. 17-21.

Cet article est également disponible à l'adresse électronique :

http://www.revparl.ca/29/4/29n4_06f_Rahaman.pdf

« En 2005, la Chambre haute du Japon a défilé le projet de loi du gouvernement sur la privatisation de la poste. Plusieurs membres du Parti libéral-démocrate au pouvoir ont voté avec l'opposition. Le premier ministre Junichiro Koizumi a interprété cette défaite comme une motion de censure contre lui et a demandé à l'empereur de dissoudre la Chambre basse conformément à l'article 7 de la Constitution. Le présent article porte sur l'argument traditionnel selon lequel le gouvernement parlementaire exige une discipline de parti rigoureuse. L'auteur tente de répondre à la question de savoir si la cohésion et la discipline de parti sont essentielles au maintien de la démocratie parlementaire. Selon lui, il faut que les partis permettent aux membres de s'exprimer librement, de critiquer le gouvernement et de voter selon leurs idées pour que le Parlement puisse tirer son épingle du jeu. Plus les députés possèdent de liberté, plus le processus législatif est démocratique. L'article fait valoir la nécessité d'une réforme démocratique pour que l'élaboration des politiques soit efficace. »

20. Rahat, Gideon. **Determinants of Party Cohesion: Evidence from the Case of the Israeli Parliament.** *Parliamentary Affairs*. Vol. 60, no 2, p. 279-296.

« While the parties in the Israeli Knesset (parliament) exhibit relatively high levels of cohesion, similar to parties in other parliamentary democracies, a comparative analysis of party cohesion in roll-call voting across time and among the various parties reveals interesting patterns. »

21. Bailer, Stefanie, Bütikofer, Sarah, Hug, Simon, Schulz, Tobias. **Preferences, party discipline and constituency pressure in Swiss parliamentary decisions.** Dans. ECPR General Conference Pisa. p. 41.

« Despite the fact that parliament elects the government in Switzerland, the latter's survival does not depend on the former. This hybrid system, i.e. neither parliamentary nor presidential, has led to a formally rather strong parliament, but with very weak resources. While several studies have shown the consequences of this on party cohesion, few insights exist on MPs' voting behaviour. Relying on detailed information on MPs' preferences from a survey we study the effects of these controlling for party and constituency pressures. »

22. Thames, Frank C. **Discipline and Party Institutionalization in Post-Soviet Legislatures.** *Party Politics*. Vol. 13, p. 456-477.

« Fearing that weak or poorly institutionalized party systems may undermine democratic consolidation, scholars have examined party systems in a myriad of contexts. The vast majority of these studies utilize aggregate measures of party system institutionalization to assess the relative merits of individual systems. While laudable, relying on aggregate measures may obscure the effects of the variation in party institutionalization in different systems. This article examines legislative politics in postCommunist Russia and Ukraine to determine whether variation in party institutionalization, even in weakly institutionalized party systems, has significant effects. The empirical results show that variation in party institutionalization creates variation in levels of parliamentary party discipline in both contexts. This raises the possibility that systemic level analyses of party system institutionalization are ignoring the effects of within-system variation. »

CANADA

23. Black, Jerome H.; Hicks, Bruce M. **Free votes and party discipline.** Dans *Strengthening Canadian Democracy: The Views of Parliamentary Candidates*. J. H. Black; B. M. Hicks. IRRP, 2006, p. 34-36. (Enjeux publics).
<http://www.irpp.org/pm/archive/pmvol7no2.pdf>

24. Kam, Christopher. **Demotion and dissent in the Canadian Liberal Party.** *British Journal of Political Science.* Vol. 36, no 3, p. 561-574.

« [Canadian] Prime ministers have at their disposal a variety of institutional tools with which to enforce party discipline. The powers to invoke the confidence convention and to dissolve parliament are the most well known and powerful of these tools, but these heavy-handed measures are ill-suited for securing unity on an on-going basis. The prime minister's monopoly over the distribution of preferment is a far more reliable means of ensuring members' loyalty. The rules of the game are simple: if the MP wishes to climb the parliamentary career ladder, he or she must toe the party line. [However,] some MPs must be brought into cabinet because they are too powerful and dangerous to leave on the backbench where they can openly challenge the prime minister. »

25. Kilgour, David, Kirsner, John, McConnell, Kenneth. **Discipline versus Democracy: Party Discipline in Canadian Politics.** Dans *Crosscurrents: Contemporary Political Issues.* 6e. Charlton. Scarborough: Nelson Education Ltd., 2009, p. 219-224.

26. Malloy, Jonathan. **High discipline, low cohesion? the uncertain patterns of canadian parliamentary party groups.** Dans *Cohesion and Discipline in Legislatures: Political Parties, Party Leadership, Parliamentary Committees and Governance.* R. Y. Hazan. London: Routledge, 2006, p. 116-129. (Library of legislative studies).

« Canadian parliamentary party groups present a mixed picture of discipline and cohesion. Canadian House of Commons votes are tightly disciplined by party with less dissent than in Britain. Yet traditional Canadian parties have been quite ideologically heterogeneous, with cohesion based more on personal relationships and loyalties than shared ideological bonds. The arrival of new parties in 1993 has challenged this traditional pattern, but the differences between older and newer parties are more in degree than kind. This article hypothesises that these trends are linked to the fluid membership base of Canadian parties, which tends to reinforce central power. The result is disciplined and somewhat cohesive parties, but with a lack of ideological direction or consistency. »

27. McGhee, Eric; Moscardelli, Vincent G. **Party Discipline and the Democratic Deficit.** *Conference Papers -- Midwestern Political Science Association.* (2006 Annual Meeting), p. 1-40.

« We examine the 2002 rebellion against Chrétien from the perspective of the U.S. Congress, where party discipline is low. This exercise highlights some underappreciated similarities between the two institutions. »

28. Morton, Desmond. **Réflexions sur les transfuges politiques.** *Revue parlementaire canadienne.* Vol. 29, no 2 (Été 2006), p. 4-9.
Également disponible à l'adresse électronique
http://www.revparl.ca/29/2/29n2_06f_Morton.pdf

« Ayant retenu l'attention du public, certains changements d'allégeance de députés fédéraux ont suscité des questions sur la fréquence d'un tel comportement ainsi que sur le contexte politique et éthique de ces gestes. Le présent article se fonde sur une étude rédigée, à l'origine, pour le Bureau du commissaire à l'éthique de la Chambre des communes en août 2005. Il est reproduit avec la permission de l'auteur et du Bureau du commissaire à l'éthique. »

ÉTATS-UNIS

29. Carson, Jamie L. et autres. **The Electoral Costs of Party Loyalty in Congress.** *American Journal of Political Science.* Vol. 54, no 3, p. 598-616.

« To what extent is party loyalty a liability for incumbent legislators? Past research on legislative voting and elections suggests that voters punish members who are ideologically “out of step” with their districts. In seeking to move beyond the emphasis in the literature on the effects of ideological extremity on legislative vote share, we examine how partisan loyalty can adversely affect legislators' electoral fortunes. Specifically, we estimate the effects of each legislator's party unity—the tendency of a member to vote with his or her party on salient issues that divide the two major parties—on vote margin when running for reelection. Our results suggest that party loyalty on divisive votes can indeed be a liability for incumbent House members. In fact, we find that voters are not punishing elected representatives for being too ideological; they are punishing them for being too partisan. »

30. Chiou, Fang-Yi; Rothenberg, Lawrence S. **A Unified Theory of U.S. Lawmaking: Preferences, Institutions, and Party Discipline.** *Journal of Politics.* Vol. 71, no 4, p. 1257-1272.

« We develop a unified theory of lawmaking that integrates preferences, institutional features, and imperfect party discipline. This model both parsimoniously subsumes numerous extant models and allows for examination of heretofore unexplored equilibria behavior. To demonstrate this, we pinpoint what effects the kinds of changes that reformers often focus on—strengthening parties and loosening the filibuster rule—might have on the equilibrium gridlock interval and generate a number of nonintuitive results. We also find that our unified model's empirical implications are consistent with the gridlock pattern found in the data. We conclude that this model is theoretically important and empirically relevant. »

31. Coleman Battista, James; Richman, Jesse T. **Party Pressure in the U.S. State Legislatures.** *Legislative Studies Quarterly.* Vol. 36, no 3 (August 2011), p. 397-422.

« Examining 27 state lower chambers, we find that overall parties exert detectable influence on 44% of all roll calls and 69% of close votes, but that the incidence of party

influence varies strongly across chambers. Taking advantage of the comparative leverage the state context brings, we find that party influence responds significantly to measures of legislative careerism and state socioeconomic diversity, with majority size playing some role. The effect of preference polarization is complicated and conditioned by challenges facing the legislature, and we find results both challenging and conditionally supporting the conditional party government account. »

32. Diermeier, Daniel ; Vlaicu, Razvan. **Parties, Coalitions, and the Internal Organization of Legislatures.** *American Political Science Review*. Vol. 105, no 2, p. 359-380.

« We present a theory of parties-in-legislatures that can generate partisan policy outcomes despite the absence of any party-imposed voting discipline. Legislators choose all procedures and policies through majority-rule bargaining and cannot commit to vote against their preferences on either. Yet, off-median policy bias occurs in equilibrium because a majority of legislators with correlated preferences has policy-driven incentives to adopt partisan agenda-setting rules—as a consequence, bills reach the floor disproportionately from one side of the ideological spectrum. The model recovers, as special cases, the claims of both partisan and nonpartisan theories in the ongoing debate over the nature of party influence in the U.S. Congress. We show that (1) party influence increases in polarization, and (2) the legislative median controls policy making only when there are no bargaining frictions and no polarization. We discuss the implications of our findings for the theoretical and empirical study of legislatures. »

33. Kanthak, Kristin. **U.S. State Legislative Committee Assignments and Encouragement of Party Loyalty: An Exploratory Analysis.** *State Politics & Policy Quarterly*. Vol. 9, no 3 (Fall 2009), p. 284-303.

« The article studies how political parties in U.S. state legislatures can encourage party loyalty among legislators by granting or withholding influential committee assignments. The article tests the hypothesis that in states where (1) party leaders control legislative committee assignments and (2) committees have significant policy authority, legislators will be more likely to vote in line with party ideology. Five state legislative bodies with differing rules are studied: Connecticut, Georgia, Iowa, Louisiana, and South Carolina. »

34. Medina, Luis Fernando. **Party Discipline with Legislative Initiative.** *British Journal of Political Science*. Vol. 36, no 1, p. 113-132.

« This article analyses the role of parties in political systems with legislative initiative. The model explicitly takes into account the multi-district nature of elections so that voters recognize that they are not voting for a policy but for members of a policy-making body. In this setting, parties can attain their ideological goals without resorting to extreme discipline of their members in the legislature. With respect to the electorate, although voters are endowed with perfect information about their candidates' ideological stance, this model explains how the legislature will display correlation across ideology and party, a feature often attributed to imperfect information. »

35. Pearson, Kathryn. **Party Loyalty in Senate.** Dans *Why Not Parties?: Party Effects in the United States Senate.* N. W. Monroe; J. M. Robert; D. W. Rhode. Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 2008, p. 101-120.

« Argues that despite the differences between the House and Senate with regards to the opportunity of party leaders to discipline members, over the years, party leaders disciplined more often their reluctant Senators, especially when without discipline the party would have lost the vote. »

36. Volden, Craig; Bergman, Elizabeth. **How Strong Should Our Party Be? Party Member Preferences Over Party Cohesion.** *Legislative Studies Quarterly.* Vol. 31, no 1 (February 2006), p. 71-104.

« In this article, we seek to explain when and why political parties pressure their members to vote with the party. We model party cohesion as an endogenous choice of preference alignment by party members. Couched in Krehbiel's (1996, 1998) pivotal politics model, the formal theory advanced here shows party cohesion to be related to the initial preference alignment of party members, the divergence in preferences between parties, the cohesion of the opposing party, the party's size, and the party's majority or minority status. »

ÉTUDES COMPARATIVES OU GÉNÉRALES

37. Carey, John M. **Competing Principals, Political Institutions, and Party Unity in Legislative Voting.** *American Journal of Political Science* Vol. 51, no 1 (January 2007), p. 92-107.

« Almost all legislators are subordinate to party leadership within their assemblies. Institutional factors shape whether, and to what degree, legislators are also subject to pressure from other principals whose demands may conflict with those of party leaders. This article presents a set of hypotheses on the nature of competing pressures driven by formal political institutions and tests the hypotheses against a new dataset of legislative votes from across 19 different countries. Voting unity is lower where legislators are elected under rules that provide for intraparty competition than where party lists are closed, marginally lower in federal than unitary systems, and the effects on party unity of being in government differ in parliamentary versus presidential systems. In the former, governing parties are more unified than the opposition, win more, and suffer fewer losses due to disunity. In systems with elected presidents, governing parties experience no such boosts in floor unity, and their legislative losses are more apt to result from cross-voting. »

38. Carey, John M.; Reynolds, Andrew. **Parties and Accountable Government in New Democracies.** *Party Politics*. Vol. 13, no 2, p. 255-274.

« Political scientists have long associated accountability with strong political parties, and have also frequently noted the weakness of parties in new democracies. This article disaggregates the strong party ideal into two components - legislative discipline and programmatic platforms - and suggests that the former in the absence of the latter can undermine accountability. We describe levels of discipline in parties in various new democracies. Then we provide a taxonomy of political party origins, according to how origins affect the proclivity of parties toward both programmatic policy and legislative discipline. »

39. Colomer, Josep M. **Policy making in divided government: a pivotal actors model with party discipline.** *Public Choice*. Vol. 125, no 3-4, p. 247-269.

« This article presents a formal model of policy decision-making in an institutional framework of separation of powers in which the main actors are pivotal political parties with voting discipline. The basic model developed from pivotal politics theory for US law-making is here modified to account for policy outcomes and institutional performances in other presidential regimes, especially in Latin America. Legislators' party indiscipline at voting and multi-partism appear as favorable conditions to reduce the size of the equilibrium set containing collectively inefficient outcomes, while a two-party system with strong party discipline is most prone to produce 'gridlock'. The article's framework can induce significant revisions of empirical data, especially regarding the effects of situations of unified and divided government, different decision rules, the number of parties and their discipline. »

40. Depauw, Sam. **Government party discipline in parliamentary democracies: the cases of Belgium, France and the United Kingdom in the 1990s.** Dans *Cohesion and Discipline in Legislatures: Political Parties, Party Leadership, Parliamentary Committees and Governance*. R. Y. Hazan. London: Routledge, 2006, p. 130-146. (Library of legislative studies).

« In recent years the level of cohesion in parliamentary parties has continued to increase. Whereas in Congress the party leadership's capabilities to solve collective action problems and to reduce transaction costs have been in doubt, in parliamentary systems little seems to warrant such doubt. Therefore, the aim of this article is to trace the party leadership's particular capabilities to secure party unity in parliamentary systems by means of (i) contract design, (ii) screening and selection, (iii) monitoring and information requirements, and (iv) institutional checks. To the extent that these capabilities affect members differently, it is possible to sketch their contours on the basis of who the rebels are. It is apparent that discipline is not readily explained in terms of rewards and punishments. Factions and tendencies provide perhaps the most valid prediction for dissent in France and the United Kingdom, whereas in Belgium the extra-parliamentary party leadership and a detailed policy agreement have a strong impact on members' discipline. »

41. Depauw, Sam; Martin, Shane. **Legislative Party Discipline and Cohesion in Comparative Perspective**. Dans *Intra-Party Politics and Coalition Governments in Parliamentary Democracies*. D. Giannetti; K. B. New York: Routledge, 2009, p. 103-120.

42. Doring, Herbet. **Party discipline and government imposition of restrictive rules**. Dans *Cohesion and Discipline in Legislatures: Political Parties, Party Leadership, Parliamentary Committees and Governance*. R. Y. Hazan. London: Routledge, 2006, p. 147-163. (Library of legislative studies).

« Government imposition of restrictive rules is a fact of life in parliamentary democracies. In a novel data set for the study of the parliamentary passage of legislation (SPPL) in western Europe no less than 80 of 512 bills were enacted by some kind of restrictive rule across 17 parliamentary systems. These highly variegated restrictions consist of two distinct types: rules governing amendment control and restrictions on the timetable. Both types of restrictive rules are frequently employed to create ‘party discipline by default’ in incohesive parties. Referring to formalised rational-choice theories of parliamentary behaviour, seven empirically testable hypotheses are derived and subsequently subjected, with bills as units of analysis, to logistic regression of the likelihood of restrictions being imposed. Of the seven hypotheses, two are rejected and five confirmed. »

43. Eguia, Jon X. **Endogenous Parties in an Assembly** *American Journal of Political Science*. Vol. 55, no 1 (January 2011), p. 16-26.

« In this article, I show how members of an assembly form voting blocs strategically to coordinate their votes and affect the policy outcome chosen by the assembly. In a repeated voting game, permanent voting blocs form in equilibrium. These permanent voting blocs act as endogenous political parties that exercise party discipline. In a stylized assembly I prove that the equilibrium parties must be two small polarized voting blocs, one at each side of the ideological divide. »

44. Eguia, Jon X. **Voting blocs, party discipline and party formation**. *Games & Economic Behavior*. Vol. 73, no 1, p. 111-135.

« I study the strategic incentives to coordinate votes in an assembly. Coalitions form voting blocs, acting as single players and affecting the policy outcome. In an assembly with two exogenous parties I show how the incentives to accept party discipline depend on the types of the agents, the sizes of the parties, and the rules the blocs use to aggregate preferences. In a game of fully endogenous party formation, I find sufficient conditions for the existence of equilibria with one bloc, two blocs, and multiple blocs. »

45. Fredriksson, Per G. et Wollscheid, Jim R. **Party Discipline and Environmental Policy: The Role of “Smoke-filled Back Rooms”**. *Scandinavian Journal of Economics*. Vol. 112 no 3 (September 2010), p. 489-513.

« We adopt the view that greater party discipline induces legislators to commit to promised policies after being elected. We then develop the hypothesis that the effect of party discipline on the stringency of environmental policy is conditional on the degree of government corruption. Our empirical work suggests that greater party discipline results in more stringent environmental policies when the level of corruption is relatively low, but in weaker policies when the level of corruption is comparatively high. »

46. Garner, Christopher et Letki, Natalia. **Party Structure and Backbench Dissent in the Canadian and British Parliaments.** *Canadian Journal of Political Science*. Vol. 38, no 2, p. 463-482.

« Cet article traite des déterminants intra-partis du comportement de dissidence en examinant des groupes de députés d'arrière-ban des gouvernements britannique et canadien. En contrôlant pour la gamme de facteurs qui sont traditionnellement considérés comme étant les prédicteurs importants du comportement de dissidence, nous trouvons qu'à part la durée de service du député, la perception d'isolement des voies de communication et d'influence du parti constitue le principal facteur incitant le député à voter pour un autre parti. [...] Les résultats suggèrent que les différences de niveaux de dissidence entre les Chambres des communes canadienne et britannique s'expliquent par la façon dont les députés de premier plan gèrent la ressource principale du parti, c'est-à-dire les députés d'arrière-ban. »

47. Grossman, Gene M.; Helpman, Elhanan. **A Protectionist Bias in Majoritarian Politics.** *The Quarterly Journal of Economics* Vol. 4, p. 1239-1282.

« We develop a novel model of campaigns, elections, and policy-making in which the ex ante objectives of national party leaders differ from the ex post objectives of elected legislators. This generates a distinction between “policy rhetoric” and “policy reality” and introduces an important role for “party discipline” in the policy-making process. We identify a protectionist bias in majoritarian politics. When trade policy is chosen by the majority delegation and legislators in the minority have limited means to influence choices, the parties announce trade policies that favor specific factors, and the expected tariff or export subsidy is positive. Positions and expected outcomes monotonically approach free trade as party discipline strengthens. »

48. Hazan, Reuven Y. **Does cohesion equal discipline? Towards a conceptual delineation.** Dans *Cohesion and Discipline in Legislatures: Political Parties, Party Leadership, Parliamentary Committees and Governance*. R. Y. Hazan. London: Routledge, 2006, p. 1-11. (Library of legislative studies).

« Although it is common in the literature to distinguish between cohesion and discipline, these terms are rarely demarcated properly and prominent legislative scholars use them interchangeably. The delineation presented in this article attempts not only to distinguish between these two concepts but to divorce them, using two different approaches to party

unity. The first is sociological, which emphasises norms and roles. The second is institutional, and it stresses strategic incentives and constraints. Herein lies the distinction between cohesion (agreement, or shared preferences) and discipline (the enforcement of obedience). This article argues that parties are more than shared preferences. Parties matter, even once preferences have been taken into account. If this is the case, then it is important to distinguish between how preferences can hold parties together, how parties can hold themselves together when preferences are not enough, and how to delineate between these two separate determinants of party unity. »

49. Kam, Christopher J. **Party discipline and parliamentary politics**. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2009. 265 p.
324.241 K15 2009

« This 2009 text examines the relationship between party leaders and Members of Parliament in Britain, Canada, Australia, and New Zealand, showing how the two sides interact and sometimes clash. Christopher J. Kam demonstrates how incentives for MPs to dissent from their parties have been amplified by a process of partisan dealignment that has created electorates of non-partisan voters who reward shows of political independence. Party leaders therefore rely on a mixture of strategies to offset these electoral pressures, from offering MPs advancement to threatening discipline, and ultimately relying on a long-run process of socialization to temper their MPs' dissension. »

50. Owens, John E. **Explaining party cohesion and discipline in democratic legislatures : purposiveness and contexts**. Dans *Cohesion and Discipline in Legislatures: Political Parties, Party Leadership, Parliamentary Committees and Governance*. R. Y. Hazan. London: Routledge, 2006, p. 12-40. (Library of legislative studies).

« Legislative party discipline and cohesion are important phenomena in the study of political systems. Unless assumptions are made that parties are cohesive and act as unified collectivities with reasonably well-defined goals, it is really difficult, if not impossible, to consider their electoral and legislative roles usefully. But levels of legislative party cohesiveness are also important because they provide us with crucial information about how legislatures/parliaments function and how they interact with executives/governments. Without cohesive (or disciplined) parties, government survival in parliamentary systems is threatened because executive and legislative powers are fused while in separated systems presidents' bases of legislative support become less stable. How do we explain varying levels of legislative party cohesion? The first part of this article draws on the purposive literature to explore the benefits and costs to legislators in democratic legislatures of joining and acting collectively and individualistically within political parties. This leads on to a discussion of various conceptual and empirical problems encountered in analysing intra-party cohesion and discipline in democratic legislatures on plenary votes. Finally, the article reviews the extant empirical evidence on how a multiplicity of systemic, party-levels and situational factors supposedly impact cohesion/discipline levels. The article ends with a discussion of the possibilities and limitations of building comparative models of cohesion/discipline. »

51. Sieberer, Ulrich. **Party unity in parliamentary democracies: a comparative analysis.** *Journal of Legislative Studies*. Vol. 12, no 2, p. 150-178.

« This article presents a non-formal model explaining party unity in legislative voting as the result of individual legislators' decisions reacting to the incentives and constraints created by their respective institutional environments. Hypotheses derived from the model are tested against empirical data on party unity in eleven western parliamentary democracies since 1945. »

FRANCE

52. Castagnez, Noëlline. **Discipline partisane et indisciplines parlementaires.** *Parlement[s], Revue d'histoire politique*. Vol. 2, no 6, p. 40-56.

53. Roussellier, Nicolas. **Les socialistes face à la forme parlementaire : l'intrusion de la discipline partisane (1893-1940).** *Parlement[s], Revue d'histoire politique*. Vol. 2, no 6, p. 30-39.

54. Sauger, Nicolas. **Party Discipline and Coalition Management in the French Parliament** *West European Politics*. Vol. 32, no 2 (March 2009), p. 310-326.

« Increased cohesion of groups and political blocks within the French parliament is one key reason for the stabilisation of the political regime under the Fifth Republic. This article starts with precise measures of the extent to which patterns of cohesion have changed throughout the twentieth century in France. It then moves to explain why cohesion has improved with the new regime of the Fifth Republic despite the change to a single member district electoral system and the direct election of the president. Both are generally expected to threaten cohesion. The two-round electoral system and semi-presidentialism prove, however, to be important explanations of the emergence of strict discipline in the French parliament. »

GRANDE-BRETAGNE

55. Benedetto, Giacomo; Hix, Simon. **The Rejected, the Ejected, and the Dejected: Explaining Government Rebels in the 2001-2005 British House of Commons.** *Comparative Political Studies*. Vol. 40, no 7, p. 755-781.

« The combination of parliamentary government and plurality elections in the British House of Commons is often assumed to produce highly cohesive parliamentary parties. However, the number and magnitude of backbench revolts against the governing party in

the British Parliament has increased since the 1960s. The contention of this article is that particular forms of rebellion against the government are the norm rather than the exception in Britain. The reason, the authors contend, is that members of Parliament (MPs) who have been refused ministerial promotion or who are ex-ministers cannot be controlled by the promise of ministerial office and are hence free to vote against the government if they have variant policy preferences from the cabinet. This idea is confirmed in an analysis of Labour MPs' voting behavior in the 2001-2005 House of Commons. »

56. Cowley, Philip ; Stuart, Mark. **Party Rules, OK: Voting in the House of Commons on the Human Fertilisation and Embryology Bill.** *Parliamentary Affairs*. Vol. 63, no 1, p. 173-181.

« The Human Fertilisation and Embryology Bill, which passed through the Westminster Parliament in 2007–08, demonstrated the dominance of party, even when the whips are removed and MPs are given a free vote. The party composition of the Commons determined the passage of the Bill and there is evidence that on abortion the dominance of party is becoming stronger still. There was also a gendered dimension to the voting, but even on abortion—the archetypical women's issue—the gender dimension came a poor second to the strength of party in determining the outcome of the vote. »

57. Kam, Christopher; Bianco, William T.; Sened, Itai; Smyth, Regina. **Ministerial Selection and Intraparty Organization in the Contemporary British Parliament.** *American Political Science Review*. Vol. 104, no 2 (May 2010), p. 289-306.

« This article promotes a characterization of intraparty politics that explains how rank-and-file party members control the delegation of power to their cabinet ministers and shadow cabinet ministers. Using the uncovered set as a solution concept and a measure of party members' collective preferences, we explore the hypothesis that backbenchers' preferences constrain the ministerial selection process in a manner that mitigates agency problems. Specifically, promotion is distributed preferentially to members whose own policy preferences are proximate to the uncovered set of all party members' preferences. Our analysis of ministerial appointments in the contemporary British Parliament supports this view. »

58. Norton, Philip. **Cohesion without discipline: party voting in the House of Lords.** Dans *Cohesion and Discipline in Legislatures: Political Parties, Party Leadership, Parliamentary Committees and Governance*. R. Y. Hazan. London: Routledge, 2006, p. 57-72.

« The British House of Lords constitutes an ideal chamber for the purposes of studying party cohesion. It is a chamber in which the political parties lack the constraints and incentives that in other legislative chambers normally constitute the means available to ensure party unity. Analysis of voting behaviour in the House of Lords demonstrates a high level of cohesion. There is no evidence to sustain institutional explanations of

cohesion. The most plausible explanations are sociological, socialisation to party norms occurring prior to arrival in parliament. Philip Norton (Lord Norton of louth) is professor of government at the university of hull and a conservative peer. »

PARLEMENT EUROPÉEN

59. Bailer, Stefanie; Schulz, Tobias; Selb, Peter. **What Role for the Party Group Leader? A Latent Variable Approach to Leadership Effects on Party Group Cohesion in the European Parliament** *Journal of Legislative Studies*. Vol. 15, no 4 (December 2009), p. 355-378.

« Previous research has identified several structural and situational factors that affect party cohesion in parliamentary voting behaviour. The potential role of leadership has been neglected so far. The authors apply a latent variable approach to model leadership effects in roll call votes from the European Parliament (EP), 1979-2001. Other things being equal, their findings suggest that a small but significant 7 per cent share of the total variance in party group cohesion is due to the party group leaders. About 40 per cent of this leader component can be accounted for by their experience inside the European institutions, their career prospects, and their ideological positions. »

60. Lindberg, Bjorn. **Fit for European Democracy?: Party Discipline in the European Parliament**. Uppsala University: Uppsala, 2008. 172 p.
<http://uu.diva-portal.org/smash/record.jsf?pid=diva2:171798&rvn=1>

« This study analyses how the transnational party groups of the European Parliament are able to generate voting cohesion. Drawing on rational institutionalist theories of political parties and theories of collective action, the study outlines two competitive scenarios for explaining party group voting cohesion in the European Parliament. In the party group disciplinary scenario, the party group leadership is able to enforce voting cohesion through its disciplinary powers. The national party discipline scenario predicts that party group voting cohesion is dependent on the voluntary cooperation of the national party delegations. »

61. Roland, Gérard. **Legislative Behavior in the European Parliament** *CESifo Economic Studies*. Vol. 55, no 1 (mars 2009), p. 15-29.

« This article summarizes research on the analysis of roll call votes in the European Parliament since the European Parliament was elected by universal suffrage and draws lessons about legislative behavior in the European Parliament. The research shows that voting in the European Parliament occurs along supranational party lines and not along geographical lines. Party cohesion has increased with the powers of the European Parliament. This increased cohesion is the reflection of European party discipline based on cohesion of national party groups. Moreover, coalition frequency is related mostly to ideological closeness between party groups. »

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65. Massicotte, Louis. **La discipline de vote**. Dans *Le parlement du Québec de 1867 à aujourd'hui*. L. Massicotte. Québec: Les Presse de l'Université Laval, 2009, p. 223-227.
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